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ABSTRACT
The Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference of
1922 occurred concurrently and were the first major post-World War I conferences to
address post-war issues. The Washington Naval Conference sought to avoid the outbreak
of future hostilities by reducing the total tonnage of capital ships in each signatory
nation’s fleet to only that of a defensive force. The Far Eastern Affairs Conference
sought to modify and modernize the relations of its signatories in China to create stability
by removing many of potential sources of future conflicts due to conflicted diplomatic
privileges. Both conferences had successes and failures diplomatically but both worked
concurrently to create a system of treaties that helped create peace and stability in Europe
and Asia for a decade. This examination of both conferences is unique because it uses
materials from during the conferences and written afterwards to provide a new
examination of these events.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1922 the five most influential powers in the world, as defined by
military might, economic development, and diplomatic standing, met together in
Washington D.C. to create a system of treaties to refine the post-World War I world.
These five Great Powers met together in two interlinked and concurrent conferences, the
Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference. Each conference
addressed a specific and focused agenda, and the success of both was vital if a new
system of balance between the attending Great Powers were to be successfully created.
In 1922 each of these five Great Powers - the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan,
and Italy - for the first time since 1919 collectively evaluated the global balance of power
between them and sought through diplomacy to avoid future sources of potential conflict.
The lessons from World War I were still fresh in the minds of these attending statesmen
in 1922. By 1914 nationalist agendas had pushed the Great Powers into a spirit of
competition rather than cooperation, and these conferences were part of a series of
ongoing diplomatic efforts in the 1920s and the 1930s to avoid those same mistakes that
had sparked World War I. This thesis specifically challenges the long-held historical
perception that the diplomacy of the interwar years was a complete failure because it did
not successfully address the political instability created by the rise of both Japanese
militarism and Nazi Germany in the 1930s. It argues that the two major diplomatic
efforts of the early 1920s, the Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference, were actually both successes because they achieved stability among the
major powers, even in the turbulent Far East, that allowed for a decade of peace and
international order.

Both conferences began on 12 November 1922 and met continuously until 6
February 1923. The Washington Naval Conference was only attended by delegations of
the five Great Powers, while, in contrast, the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was
attended by delegations from the five Great Powers plus China, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Portugal. Each of these attending powers had direct interests in China,
its surrounding territories, or within the Pacific Ocean. The Washington Naval
Conference focused upon the issue of naval armament levels and worked to create a
universal treaty that would gradually reduce each signatory’s naval capacity over a
decade to a fixed comparative ratio of strength. The Washington Naval Conference
addressed this goal by reducing the number of capital ships held by each of the Great
Powers until their respective fleets would be able to adequately defend their standing
territorial interests but also be inadequate for aggressive war. Beyond naval ratios, this
conference also addressed other issues of armaments; it formulated a revolutionary treaty
on submarine warfare that regulated the conduct of submarines as commerce raiders.
These regulations reduced the value of submarines in aggressive war but still allowed
their use as a defensive option. The conference also formulated a treaty expanding the
earlier prohibition in the Versailles Treaty of 1919 on the use of poison or asphyxiating
gases; the Versailles Treaty prohibited their use to Germany and the Washington Naval
Conference expanded that ban to all the Great Powers. The Washington Naval
Conference was not a unilateral success; it attempted and failed to regulate the use of
airplanes in combat and was unable to even open discussions on the topic of reductions in
Great Power land forces. 1
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The Washington Naval Conference’s treaty regulating the use of submarines as
commerce raiders was unique because it required submarines prior to attacking
commercial shipping to complete a series of steps to prevent the loss of civilian life. The
conference delegates knew that these steps would be impossible to follow and still allow
a submarine to serve as an effective commerce raider, so this treaty was seen at the time
as an indirect ban on submarine commerce raiding. What was revolutionary though
about this treaty was that it held submarine crews and their captains personally
responsible for any violations of the treaty terms, irrespective of whether their
government or military command ordered the submarines’ officers and crew to violate
the treaty terms. Any submarine crew captured violating the agreed treaty terms was to
be treated as pirates by the capturing nation. This regulatory framework on submarine
commerce raiding was the result of a compromise between British, French, and Italian
interests regarding submarine regulation versus prohibition; the principle of military
figures being held personally accountable for their actions even if acting under orders
was a powerful one that would long outlive this initial appearance. Despite this longreaching success, all the work of the conference, from the submarine treaty to the capital
ship ratio treaty, required careful diplomacy and the Great Powers compromising their
national interests before any successes were achieved. The Washington Naval
Conference did not overcome national tensions or Great Power ambitions, but instead it
channeled them into mutually acceptable compromises. What made this conference
particularly successful is that despite nationalist drives and competing Great Power goals,

Second Yearbook of the League of Nations: January 1, 1921 – February 6, 1922 (Brooklyn: Brooklyn
Daily Eagle, 1922), 220, 367, 402
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the final treaties successfully maintained the global balance of power while also causing
far-reaching reductions in the naval power of each signatory nation. 2
In contrast to the Washington Naval Conference, the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference had a more checkered record of success; most of the agreements struck at this
conference simply maintained or broadened existing foreign nations’ positions and
privileges in China and the Pacific. The Far Eastern Affairs Conference was originally
called to defuse through negotiation growing Great Power tensions that were primarily
over China. Great Britain, France, the United States, and Japan each had direct
commercial interests within China due to past treaties and investments; of these four
powers, Japan and the United States were in the most direct diplomatic conflict in 1922
over China’s future. Japan, heavily invested in Manchuria and granted in 1919
Germany’s former Chinese territorial concessions, was highly interested in maintaining
the status quo in China. The United States, in contrast, had an interest in China being
transformed from a nation divided into exclusive economic zones, respectively the
spheres of influence held by Great Britain, France, and Japan, into a nation entirely and
equally open to all foreign trade. Balanced between the ambitions of Japan and the
United States was the newly formed Chinese Republic. Beset by civil war and political
uncertainty, its delegation at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference attempted through
diplomacy to radically challenge the status quo in China. In essence, the Chinese
delegation hoped to use the conference to transform China from a near vassal of the Great
Powers into a unified and independent regional power. Although the United States
supported the ideal of the Chinese Republic gaining greater control over the
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administration of China, it willingly compromised this ideal to gain its own goal of open
trade. For this reason, throughout the conference the United States only used its
influence to assist the Chinese Republic in gaining meager additional administrative
authority within China. 3
The major accomplishment of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was the
creation of the Nine-Power Treaty. This omnibus treaty granted the Chinese Republic
conditional autonomy over China’s mail system and radio communication network: the
first contingent on the Chinese Republic ensuring the regular operation of the mail and
the second contingent on the Chinese Republic purchasing any radio stations it wished to
control. Beyond those two concessions, the Nine-Power Treaty maintained the Great
Powers’ established privileges within China. The Chinese Republic had requested at the
conference that the Great Powers give up their territorial grants within China, but this
request was simply ignored by the Nine-Power Treaty. The Chinese Republic requested
the Great Powers end extraterritoriality, the Nine-Power Treaty permitted the issue to be
studied for possible future action, the study duly occurred, and no changes were ever
actually implemented. The Chinese Republic requested that all unauthorized foreign
troops stationed in China be withdrawn, the Nine-Power Treaty also left this to future
study and possible resolution, and again no change was actually made. The Chinese
Republic finally requested the right to control its own taxation of imports, but this request
was flatly denied in the Nine -Power Treaty as being contrary to open trade. The NinePower Treaty fixed all import taxes in China for the upcoming decade and forced the
Chinese Republic to renounce a tax on internal trade in exchange for a limited
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concession, an update to the permitted tariff tables. The only major gain achieved by the
Chinese Republic while the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was in session occurred
outside the conference proper, the directly negotiated Shantung Treaty between it and
Japan, which returned the Shantung Peninsula from Japanese control to the Chinese
Republic. 4
The other major diplomatic accomplishment achieved during the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference was also negotiated outside the conference proper; however, its
successful negotiation was vital to the success of both conferences. The Four-Power
Accord, signed between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, and France created a
treaty of mutual assistance between the four signatories applicable to conflicts arising in a
specific but broad portion of the Pacific Ocean. This new treaty pledged the signatory
powers to mutual consultation, and possible joint action, in the event of any conflict
between the signatories arising anywhere within most of the southern and central Pacific
Ocean. Although not a full defensive alliance, the Four-Power Accord replaced an older
Pacific-oriented defensive alliance between Great Britain and Japan. This new accord
was vital because before Japan would agree to any concessions in China or on naval
armament levels, it needed a treaty of mutual defense to replace the expiring AngloJapanese alliance. In turn, the United States desired a new treaty that would replace the
expiring Anglo-Japanese defensive alliance and prevent both of these powers potentially
opposing the United States in the event of a future Pacific conflict between America and
Japan. Great Britain also wanted this new accord to succeed to improve its diplomatic
relations with the United States while at the same time not angering Japan. The final
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signatory, France, was brought into the treaty to increase its defensive value for Japan
and because of French interests in Indochina and the Pacific region covered by the treaty.
The Four-Power Accord also included practical concessions. All the signatory powers
agreed not to build new military fortifications or installments, nor to improve ones
already in existence, within the region covered by the new accord. This aspect of the
agreement was strongly desired by Japan, and its inclusion further reduced the Japanese
government’s concern about its position in the Pacific or China being challenged in the
future. 5
To fully understand the work of both conferences, it is useful to understand the
diplomatic position of each of the attending Great Powers and some of the major events
that occurred from 1919 to 1922 that shaped their relative positions in the world. The
next chapter examines each of the Great Powers attending both conferences and their
relative strengths and weaknesses, and provides a more detailed overview of the major
events of both conferences. The second chapter focuses exclusively upon the work of the
Far Eastern Affairs Conference and the intricate diplomacy within and around the
conference itself; the third chapter provides a similarly focused examination of the work
of the Washington Naval Conference. The fourth and final chapter examines the impact
of the work of both conferences and places both conferences’ successes and shortcomings
within the broader stream of events that made up the later 1920s and the 1930s. When
reading each of the upcoming chapters it is useful to remember that for each conference
the overriding goal was to maintain stability through a system of treaties, treaties
balancing national interests and reducing armament levels.
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PRIOR TO THE CONFERENCES: THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
From 1918 until 1921 the great powers - Great Britain, the United States, Japan,
France, and Italy - focused almost exclusively upon immediate challenges in their
individual spheres of influence. The only international issue they addressed was the
spread of Communism. However, in 1921 these same five great powers met in the first
large scale international conference since the Versailles Treaty negotiations of 1918 to
1919 to discuss issues that were multinational in scope. This conference, the Washington
Naval Conference, was actually two linked conferences simultaneously meeting to
address growing issues in China and the Pacific islands and to find a means of mutual
arms reduction for all the attending powers. But the Washington Naval Conference of
1921 was far more than a simple meeting of nations to address these immediate issues; it
was a continuation of the work begun at the Versailles Treaty negotiations in 1918. As
had been begun at the Versailles Treaty through the mandates system and the
disarmament of Germany, this conference was a major effort by these great powers to
further outline their respective spheres of influence and ensure that the global stability
and peace between themselves that arose post-World War I would remain unbroken. At
this conference the attending powers by direct negotiation created a series of treaties that
enhanced the relative diplomatic stability of the 1920s, creating a decade of peace rather
than Great Power tension and regional instability. 6
The historically better known Washington Naval Conference of 1921 was an
effort by the attending great powers through mutual agreement to jointly limit their
ability to project naval power aggressively and challenge any other power’s sphere of
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influence. In the 1920s military planners and political leaders thought any effort by one
great power to challenge another’s sphere of influence would hinge on each power’s
relative naval strength. Therefore all the naval arms limitations agreements signed at the
Washington Naval Conference were pragmatic agreements between the great powers to
confine their ambitions within certain recognized geographic limits. By the end of the
conference, the greatest arms reduction success was the agreement between the
participating nations to limit the number and fighting capability of their capital ships,
which was thought to be a key step to ensuring stability and reducing any risk of war
between the great powers. The success of this conference at achieving naval arms
limitations was not due to idealism on the part of any participating nation, but to a cold
pragmatism that guided each attending nation’s delegation. That self-serving pragmatism
required that to avoid a ruinous and dangerous naval arms race, each attending nation
would have to accept mutual naval limitations. Much of the drama and historically
interesting material from the documentation of the Washington Naval Conference records
the story of how these mutual limitations were created and agreed upon. Unfortunately
this material, and the topic of the Washington Naval Conference, has been neglected by
modern historians since post-World War I historical writing has focused more upon
causes of World War II rather than the preventative diplomacy of the 1920s. 7

7

The historical work available on the Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference is woefully inadequate. No historical works analyzing these conferences have been produced
since Buell’s 1922 The Washington Conference and Ichihashi’s 1928 The Washington conference and
after; a historical survey. Later scholarly work putting the work of both conferences in a broader historical
context has been limited as well; few recent academic works utilize any materials produced about the
conferences in the later 1920s, and the most recent academic articles analyzing the impact of just the
Washington Naval Conference were produced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. No significant scholarly
work has emerged in any format that addresses the impact or complexities of the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference.
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From 12 November 1921 until 6 February 1922, the Washington Naval
Conference and the Conference on Far Eastern Affairs, both organized by the United
States government, met concurrently. The conferences were both formally opened on 11
November 1921 with the keynote address being given by President Warren G. Harding of
the United States. 8 Overall both of the conferences were dominated by a spirit of
cooperation between the attending great powers; several differences in policy between
them did not derail this conference as they did many future efforts at disarmament.
Negotiations between the five attending great powers were dominated by two major
underlying immediate goals; first, arriving at an agreement to contain simmering clashes
of interest in the Pacific between Great Britain, Japan, and China; and second, to ensure a
naval balance between the great powers that would preclude aggression. Despite some
fundamentally clashing national goals, such as the determination of the United States’
delegates to support the emerging Chinese republic’s efforts at self determination, or the
French delegation’s efforts to win agreement to their creating a fleet equal to Great
Britain’s in effective strength, both conferences were successful at forging lasting
compromises that superseded nationalist goals. Traditional historical analysis of the
Washington Naval Conference’s importance has focused solely on its limited material
successes, the total number of ships destroyed due to naval disarmament agreements, and
the economic impact that reduced fleet sizes had on national budgets of the 1920s 9 ;
however, naval disarmament was also a diplomatic effort to preserve a delicate balance of
power between the Great Powers that appeared likely to destabilize in 1921.
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Oxford University Press, 2005), 838.
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On the issues of naval disarmament and Pacific/Chinese regional stability, France
and Great Britain were the two attending great powers with the greatest motivation to
preserve the existing balance of power since both stood at the pinnacle of their postWorld War I power and global influence in 1921. France in that year regained AlsaceLorraine, gained access to the industrial wealth of the Saar basin under the Treaty of
Versailles, and expanded its colonies by gaining de facto control over Syria and Lebanon
within the Middle East and Togoland and Cameroon in Africa. Militarily in 1921 France
was a dominant power with the largest standing land army, one of the top fleets in
tonnage afloat, and an air force equal to that of the other great powers. However, despite
its dominant appearance in Europe, France could not hope to sustain this illusion of
strength because its economy in prosperity could only just support the French military in
1921. One indicator of this French economic weakness was that by 1921, the French
franc had fallen to one fifth of its pre-World War I value. One key reason for France’s
weak economy, despite its expanded territory, was that France lacked the population
reserves to fully rebuild in 1921 due to its losses in World War I. Due to war casualties,
France by 1918 had lost one quarter of its male population between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-seven, losses far from replenished by 1921. Another key reason France’s
economy was weak in 1921 was that its northeastern territories had been badly devastated
by the conflict. French industrial and mineral production was still below its pre-World
War I production levels; by 1921 even the damage of the German invasion had still not
been completely eradicated from the countryside. Finally France’s international
economic position was also weak because it had lost most of its overseas investments
during the war, in particular due to the fall of Tsarist Russia, and France was deeply in
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debt to the United States. All of these factors combined to require France to attempt to
safeguard its global position through diplomacy as it could not do so easily in conflict;
economically France was too weak for war or costly arms races. 10
France in 1921 was an important nation on a global scale but it was not in a
position to dominate global politics; French arms alone had not proven victorious in
World War I and it was unlikely France would triumph alone in any serious future
conflict with another Great Power. 11 Throughout the early 1920s, French foreign policy
centered upon ensuring stability through treaty and diplomacy, including at the
Washington Naval Conference. An indicator outside of the Washington Naval
Conference of this French foreign policy direction was the series of French diplomatic
initiatives in Eastern Europe, in particular their encouragement in 1921 of the formation
of the Little Entente, an allied military bloc composed of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Romania. 12 The Little Entente was created to offset the potential threat offered to France
by Germany and thereby ensure stability within Europe itself. In the 1920s the
government of France focused primarily upon the potential German menace but also
simultaneously worked to ensure the stability and security of its global colonial position
as well. France, in its foreign policy drive for stability and safety through diplomacy,
mirrored the dominant foreign policy of Great Britain in the early 1920s.
Because of World War I, Great Britain and France diplomatically became closely
linked in policies, a joint position maintained on many foreign policy issues in the 1920s.
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Militarily Great Britain in the 1920s had the most powerful fleet in the world, measured
by tonnage, a powerful air force, and spent a considerable sum per year to maintain its
military might. 13 France and Great Britain, acting in concert in the early 1920s, would
have dominated any conflict militarily, but in July 1919 the British cabinet enacted a
policy that all military planning would be predicated on the idea that “the British Empire
will not be involved in any large war over the next ten years…” Great Britain’s foreign
policy efforts in the 1920s, at least in regards to other great powers, would be achieved
through treaty and negotiation, the same tools being used by France. 14 Great Britain and
France from 1919 through 1922 respected each other’s colonial spheres of influence but
divided on the issue of stability within continental Europe. France wanted Germany to
remain weak and economically crippled, while by 1922 Great Britain desired Germany to
begin to regain some of its former position within European affairs. Great Britain’s
statesmen sought Germany’s recovery to regain a valuable economic market and to offset
perceived French continental strength. British popular opinion supported these ideas
generally and sympathized with Germany. By 1922 some vocal segments in Britain even
supported a readjustment of Germany’s eastern territorial boundaries, returning to
Germany some of its land lost under the Versailles Treaty in 1919. 15 Winston Churchill
elegantly spoke of the British attitudes towards both Germany and the French demands
for security in this period:
The British temper towards Germany, which at first had been so fierce,
very soon went as far astray in the opposite direction. A rift opened
between Lloyd George and Poincaré, whose bristling personality hampered
his firm and far-sighted policies. The two nations fell apart in thought and
13
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action, and British sympathy or even admiration for Germany found
powerful expression. 16
Britain’s softening attitude towards Germany angered France, straining diplomatic
relations between the two nations by 1922. This tension was also fueled when Great
Britain bowed out of the possibility of an Anglo-French security accord when the United
States rejected the Versailles Treaty in 1920. 17 These existing diplomatic tensions
between France and Great Britain colored both nations’ actions at the Washington Naval
Conference. Although both worked together to broker stability in China and the Pacific,
achieving simultaneous global naval stability proved challenging.
Like France, Great Britain’s economy from 1919 – 1921 entered a period of
comparative decline due to flagging British industrial production, a diminished British
share of global trade, and an outflow of government capital to repay British war debts,
primarily to the United States. In contrast, though, to France in this period, Great Britain
could more effectively utilize its imperial holdings to its economic advantage. Britain’s
imperial territories throughout the 1920s provided an extensive market for British exports
and concurrently a source for cheap raw materials. In 1921 the British Empire in
geographic area was three times, and in population density five times, the size of the
French Empire. 18 France and Great Britain came into post-World War I economic
competition in several areas, mainly in the newly opened markets of Eastern and SouthEastern Europe. The growing economic competition between France and Great Britain,
and the disparity in their colonial holdings, helped fuel an atmosphere of mutual
animosity at the naval limitations negotiations. The French delegation, reflecting this
16
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tension, insisted on fleet parity with Great Britain multiple times during the negotiations
on the grounds that both nations were great powers with global reach. The British
delegation, considering this a threat to Great Britain’s security, in turn throughout the
conference actively resisted this demand by the French. 19
In contrast to France and Britain at the Washington Naval Conference, the United
States was extremely interested in creating a system of fixed fleet strength ratios between
the great powers. Prior to the Washington Naval Conference, the United States was
rapidly expanding its capital ship fleet, continuing a policy it had begun in 1916. This
policy of fleet expansion by the United States was due to its foreign policy in the period,
which was region specific diplomatic engagement or isolationism. From 1919 – 1921 the
United States distanced itself from political issues in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa
as long as these political issues did not impact United States’ trade. However, the United
States maintained a keen interest in political affairs in the Americas, the Pacific Ocean,
and China. As a matter of economic and political policy, the United States wished to
maintain its open access to as many markets around the globe as it could, particularly the
Chinese market. Due to the United States’ Pacific territorial holdings and its strong
presence in the Chinese market, the 1920s was a period of intense Far Eastern focus for
United States foreign policy. The United States’ rapid naval building program begun in
1916 was undertaken to ensure that the United States, without alliances, could defend its
coasts and protect its Pacific regional position, and in the Americas and Asia successfully
resist any single foreign challenger. By 1920 the United States, although behind in its

19
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planned naval construction schedule, was very close to equality with Great Britain in total
tonnage and guns afloat in capital ships. 20
The United States’ extensive naval growth in the 1920s competed directly with
Japan’s navy; diplomatically in the same period Japan and the United States were
competing over influence in China. Although the United States had the larger capital ship
fleet of the two, Japan, due to its strong defensive alliance with Great Britain, expected
British naval aid in the event of war with the United States, offsetting America’s capital
ship advantage. Japanese and American strategic planners were unsure of the true
balance of power between their respective nations in the Pacific in 1921 and this
uncertainty sparked tension between the two nations’ political leadership. Japan by 1921
was an emerging great power and a formidable regional power within both the Pacific
and northern China. By 1921 already a colonial power, Japan was also a growing
financial power due to its rapid economic growth and position as a creditor nation to
France and Great Britain. The Japanese domestic economy from the turn of the century
to 1921 had performed miracles, but by 1921 it was showing strain due to the demands
placed upon it by Japan’s naval building. Japan in 1921 came to the Washington Naval
Conference looking for a diplomatic compromise; it needed to balance its ambitions
within Asia against those of the United States as a direct competition between the two
could have ruined Japan’s economy. Japan at the Washington Naval Conference and the
Far Eastern Affairs Conference also needed to ensure its defensive strength within the
Pacific because by 1921, Great Britain was wavering in its commitment to the AngloJapanese defensive alliance. Due to this, one of the main goals of the Japanese

20
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delegation at the conference was to create a substitute means through diplomacy of
ensuring the safety and stability of Japan’s position in the Pacific and within China. 21
Each of the four great powers attending the Washington Naval Conference
reviewed so far can be paired off based on diplomatic rivalries, France in competition
with Great Britain and Japan in competition with the United States. The fifth attending
great power, Italy, was the odd man out in this regard as it entered the Washington Naval
Conference with no initial rivals. Italy was not seen initially as a threat to the other
attending great powers because Italy simply could not compete with them economically,
militarily, or even politically. Italy avoided conflict at the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference because it was not invested economically or politically in the key regions of
concern at that particular conference. Italy’s delegation at the Washington Naval
Conference focused solely on gaining French naval concessions to improve Italy’s
position in the Mediterranean and therefore became a secondary rival to France
diplomatically only after the conference had begun. British and French antagonism in the
Mediterranean encouraged Italian ambitions at the Washington Naval Conference. In the
Mediterranean, France was finally forced by diplomatic pressure to concede to Italy’s
naval goals. By the end of the Washington Naval Conference, France, due to its treaty
enforced capital ship parity with Italy, was forced to accept a regionally inferior naval
position to Italy in the Mediterranean.
For France, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, the western Pacific and
mainland China were the colonial regions that were the most likely potential centers of
future conflict. Each of the four great powers’ political leaders had uncertainties about
the region; France, for example, lacked the military power in the region in 1921 to protect
21
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its interests in Indo-China against all aggressors. Therefore, France needed to find a way,
through diplomacy, to safeguard its position within the region. Great Britain, in contrast,
in 1921 could project military power into the region that was adequate for defense of its
interests; however, if Britain was forced to defend its Pacific holdings against the United
States or Japan without allies, it was unlikely that it could concurrently ensure the
security of its other regional commitments. The United States, with its massive potential
for fleet expansion and its powerful fleet in 1921, had the potential to place sufficient
military forces into the Pacific to defend its interests against any single aggressor. But
American naval planners were unsure of victory if the United States was forced to fight
Japan and Great Britain simultaneously, a hypothetical risk due to the Anglo-Japanese
defensive alliance still nominally in force in 1921. Therefore, due to the uncertain
balance of power in the region, any diplomatic breakdowns had the potential to become
nasty and destructive regional wars. Rising diplomatic tension between the United States
and Japan in 1921 was therefore a source of concern for all the powers attending the Far
Eastern Affairs and Washington Naval Conferences. 22 Resolving this growing
diplomatic competition between the United States and Japan and ensuring long-term
stability within both the Pacific region and mainland China was one of the major goals
and major successes of both conferences.
The creation of a treaty-based solution to great power tensions over mainland
China and the Pacific region was one of the great accomplishments of the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference; it also indicates the position of both conferences as watersheds in
early inter-war diplomacy. From 1919 to 1921, many smaller diplomatic conferences
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occurred. In 1921 alone, prior to the Washington Naval Conference, Great Britain and
France met four times, along with a varying pool of other powers, to resolve diplomatic
issues sparked over the interpretation of the Versailles Treaty and reparations payments
schedules for Germany. 23 However, these diplomatic conferences occurring prior to the
Washington Naval Conference were limited in focus, called haphazardly, and only
France and Great Britain met semi-regularly to attempt to resolve foreign policy
questions in a collective manner through direct negotiation. When the Washington Naval
Conference and Far Eastern Affairs Conference both convened formally on 12 November
1921, it was the first meeting of all the great powers simultaneously since the Versailles
Treaty negotiations. The Washington Naval Conference, like the Versailles treaty
negotiations before it, modified the global balance of power by redefining the balance of
strength and position between the attending nations. Both the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference and the Washington Naval Conference had a profound impact on the
diplomacy of the 1920s and were a key component in the establishment of a period of
pan-global stability.
The single diplomatic accomplishment that is most prominently associated with
the Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference is the multinational accord that agreed to reduce naval armaments. That particular treaty was one of
the great accomplishments of both conferences, but the treaty to limit naval growth,
formally titled the Five-Power Limitation of Naval Armament Treaty, would not have
been possible without the successful negotiation of a series of other treaties first. These
other treaties created an environment of diplomatic trust between the attending powers
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that was a necessary foundation for successful disarmament. The other major treaties
negotiated at the Washington Naval Conference that made up this diplomatic framework
were primarily several treaties to normalize the existing conflicting systems of great
power privileges within China. Additional key treaties included an accord to regulate
submarine warfare and prohibit the use of poison gas in battle, and the Four-Power
accord, a treaty requiring the signatories to mediate disputes in the Pacific before
resorting to armed conflict. Of these treaties, those dealing with China and the reduction
of naval arms obligated their signatory powers to complete a series of clearly defined
actions, often to a very specific timetable. Conversely, the Four-Power accord obligated
its signatory powers to use a specific philosophy of conduct in their foreign relations,
mediation before armed conflict. Although no treaty negotiated at the conference
included enforcement clauses, the treaties on China and limiting naval strength were
“harder” treaties; non-compliance with these treaties’ terms by a signatory power would
have caused negative foreign policy ramifications for the violating nation. The treaties of
the Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference were
negotiated in a new diplomatic spirit, they relied upon the force of moral and popular
pressure to ensure compliance, that and the mutually shared benefits enjoyed by all the
signatories through global political stability. 24
Despite the potentially valuable advantages the Naval Limitations Treaty offered
by creating greater political stability, the negotiations for this treaty were generally
acrimonious because the signatory nations all found it difficult to compromise their
national goals. The primary goal of the Naval Arms Limitation Treaty was to prevent
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future naval warfare by limiting each nation’s total capital ship tonnage and naval
military strength. This goal was to be achieved by reducing the capital ship tonnage
afloat in 1921 through scuttling, restricting future capital ship construction over the
upcoming decade, and limiting each individual capital ship’s military power. The scope
of this treaty was extensive; the three main signatory naval powers, Great Britain, the
United States, and Japan, agreed to scrap 23 capital ships, 30 capital ships, and 17 capital
ships, respectively, with Japan further agreeing to abandon its planned construction of an
additional four capital ships and four cruisers in the next few years. Although Italy and
France were not required to scrap any of the capital ships they possessed in 1921, they
were expected to agree to a fixed future naval construction schedule, which in turn would
effectively reduce their overall naval strength in comparison with the other signatory
powers. By 1932 the treaty stipulated that Great Britain, the United States, Japan,
France, and Italy would have capital ship fleets whose strength, respectively by ratio and
measured in tonnage, would be 5-5-3-1.75-1.75. The Naval Arms Reduction Treaty
planned for this ratio to be achieved gradually over a ten-year span through a controlled
schedule of ship refitting, construction, and scrapping. 25 Although the Naval Arms
Limitation Treaty was successfully negotiated, it required extensive diplomatic work to
achieve. The planning of this treaty was filled with acrimony and debate. In the third
chapter of this treatise, the controversies are reviewed in depth; however, in general these
disputes occurred because each of the signatory nations in turn stalled the negotiations of
the treaty due to serious nationalist concerns. The treaty, though, was successfully
negotiated despite these initial challenges because its goal of preventing great power
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conflicts and promoting regional stability, especially in the Pacific, was too important to
the attending signatory powers to allow the negotiations to actually fail. 26
Another major treaty formulated by the Washington Naval Conference jointly
limited by agreement the signatories’ conduct of war. This treaty, agreed upon by all the
attending great powers, expanded an earlier ban on the use of poison gas on the
battlefield and regulated the use of submarines as commerce raiders. The subcommittee
that wrote this treaty discussed limitations on the use of three new weapons of war that
originated in World War I: submarines, poison or asphyxiating gases, and modern
aircraft. The committee’s decision on poison gas was comparatively simple: all the
powers agreed to expand and extend the ban on the use of these substances first initiated
in the Versailles Treaty of 1918. Conversely, the committee also easily decided that
modern aircraft had too much potential as future weapons to be restricted by a treaty, so
the effort was abandoned by mutual consent. The committee was decidedly challenged
by the issue of submarines as commerce raiders. Formulating a treaty solution to this
issue that met the demands of the British and French delegations took weeks of
negotiation. Eventually the committee was able to create a series of regulations that
forbade submarines to attack merchantmen at sea unless the merchant vessel was first
halted, searched, and legally seized, and the passengers and crew taken to safety before
any destructive force was used against the merchant ship. Furthermore the treaty stated
that any captains of submarines taken prisoner who acted in violation of these rules were
to be treated as pirates by the capturing nation, even if the captain was obeying direct
orders from his governing nation. The specific text of this treaty will be looked at in
greater depth in the third chapter. A final point of interest with this treaty is that it
26
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recognized in its own clauses the impossibility of a submarine conforming to these
regulations! Therefore this treaty as written was considered by the signatories to be an
indirect ban on the use of the submarine as a commerce raider, a compromise that was
able to partially assuage British concerns and demands on the issue of submarines and
their use, while still allowing the French the freedom to build a submarine fleet for
defense. 27
One of the two major treaties resolved outside the Washington Naval Conference
and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was the Four-Power Accord. Although it was
negotiated outside the formal conference structures, this treaty was vital to both
conferences’ success. The Four-Power Accord required that Great Britain, the United
States, France, and Japan attempt to avoid future conflicts with each other through
mediation of inter-power disputes rather then resorting to armed force. The Four-Powers
Accord also specified that in the event of any one of the contracting powers resorting to
warfare against another contracting power, the other signatories would “communicate
with one another fully and frankly as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly
and separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.” 28 The vagueness of
these requirements was deliberate and will be analyzed more fully in the third chapter;
however, beyond this vague definition of action to be undertaken in the event of conflict,
the treaty also had two additional key limitations built into it. First, the Four-Power
Accord applied only to disagreements occurring in the Pacific regions covered by the
sections on fortifications in the Naval Arms Limitations treaty, and second, the treaty
would expire after ten years. Despite these limitations, the Four-Power Accord was vital
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because it adjusted the balance of power in the Pacific by replacing the more potentially
destabilizing Anglo-Japanese defensive alliance of 1904. For Britain, this new treaty
proved the means by which it could remove itself gracefully from its no longer politically
useful defensive alliance with Japan and yet spare itself the dishonor of abandoning a
loyal ally. For the United States, the Four-Power Accord was a significant diplomatic
victory because it removed the risk of an Anglo-Japanese defensive alliance in the Pacific
and therefore reduced the risk of a belligerent Japan in the region. By allowing Great
Britain, the United States, and France the political freedom to check Japanese expansion
in the Pacific jointly, the Four-Power Accord also made Japan more cautious in its
foreign relations, further promoting Pacific regional stability. 29
The major set of treaties and resolutions negotiated at the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference focused upon China and key Pacific islands. These treaties were vital to
avoiding great power conflict in the Pacific and within China, but were struck at a high
cost to China. The Far Eastern Affairs Conference modified tariff law in China and
cemented into international law the idea of open markets within China. The treaties also
recognized Japan’s semi-colonial position within China, a vital concession to ensure the
success of the Washington Naval Conference. 30 These treaties will all be reviewed in far
greater detail in the second chapter, but all of the treaties of the Washington Naval
Conference and Far Eastern Affairs Conference are unique because they were some of
the first “openly negotiated” accords. None of these treaties were secret understandings
between states in the style of older foreign affairs but instead were diplomacy on a public
stage; the final decisions reached at this conference were going to be discussed on a
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global scale. Each agreement reached by the conference delegates could be reviewed by
each delegate nation’s domestic population and was certain to invite controversy and
commentary, accolades, and accusations; it was highly likely that few would find these
compromises ideal and very unlikely that any would consider the final products perfect.
The results of the Washington Naval Conference, along with a brief sketch of the relative
positions of each of the powers attending, have been presented in the preceding pages;
this broad overview for many post-World War II historians is sufficient attention for both
the Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference.
However, modern historical work has missed some of the underlying worth of the
work of both conferences; many primary and secondary sources on the Washington
Naval Conference and Far Eastern Affairs Conference have been neglected by postWorld War II historians. Because these conferences failed to prevent the eventual
outbreak of World War II, their historical value is denigrated. The work of these two
conferences was complicated, often highly technical, and although unsuccessful at
preventing aggression in the late 1930s, these two conferences did help prevent
aggression in the 1920s. As the next chapter will show, China, for example, was a major
source of potential great power conflict in the 1920s, but the work of the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference helped defuse that international tension immensely. In China in 1921
the emergence of a new Chinese nationalism, combined with the increasing Japanese
presence in Manchuria and the concerns of the United States about rival great powers
spheres of influence in China, created the need to establish a new balance of power in the
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region. 31 To achieve this, the delegates at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference had to
engage in a series of delicate balancing acts, balancing the demands of various nations on
specific issues against an overall goal shared by all the conference delegates to prevent
any dangerous power balance changes in China that could provoke a war.
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THE FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS CONFERENCE
The Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference met
simultaneously and were intimately linked, the work of one directly impacting the work
of the other. Without a successful agreement to contain naval strength, diplomatic efforts
to stabilize the situation in the Pacific and within China would have likely failed as the
great powers strove to safeguard their Asian positions through armaments increases.
Conversely, if the negotiations for the key treaties of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference
had failed, specifically the Four-Power Accord and the Nine-Power Treaty, then the
Naval Conference would probably in turn have failed as the great powers would have felt
it necessary to be well armed due to the risk of instability in Asia. The key issue
discussed at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was China, its domestic economy,
diplomatic status, and its continued civil war coupled with domestic instability. The
newly established Chinese Republic had sent an invited delegation to the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference in the hope that this conference would allow China an opportunity to
redress some of its grievances and regain greater control over its own affairs. By the end
of the conference, though, China found itself only a partial nation, having won pledges
from other nations to honor its national sovereignty but with few real gains that would
have given its newly recognized independent government any ability to modify the
existing status quo in China.
The Far Eastern Affairs Conference was attended by delegations from nine
different nations. Attending both the Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference were the delegations of the United States, Great Britain, France,
Japan, and Italy. In addition, delegations from China, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
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Portugal solely attended the meetings of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference. The United
States, as the organizing nation of the conference, under the direction of United States’
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, sent out an initial agenda to all attending
nations that outlined the goals of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference. It proposed that
China’s domestic challenges and international status be the central points of interest for
the conference, specifically:
… Subjects: (a) Territorial integrity, (b) Administrative integrity, (c)
Open door, equality of commercial and industrial opportunity, (d)
Concessions, monopolies or preferential economic privileges, (e)
Development of railways, including plans relating to Chinese Eastern
Railway, (f) Preferential railroad rates, (g) Status of existing commitments 32
This agenda reveals the diplomatic hopes of the United States regarding China and the
Far Eastern Affairs Conference, as four of the seven total items directly address economic
concerns, and all seven items have a direct impact on China’s value as a market for
imported goods and foreign enterprise. 33 The third subject of the agenda in particular,
the desire by the United States to discuss the Open Door policy, was the cornerstone of
American diplomatic plans for China at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference. The Open
Door policy, the ideal of all Chinese domestic markets being open equally to international
trade, without any special privileges or advantages, was the policy the United States
sought to make international law at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference.
Each issue discussed at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was initially reviewed
by a specialized subcommittee; the Chinese delegation often did well in these
subcommittee meetings diplomatically. However, the actual final negotiated agreements
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themselves were created by the assembled full meetings of the nine delegations. These
meetings, and therefore the actions of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference itself, were
dominated by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan throughout the conference. The
Chinese delegation expanded the initial agenda of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference by
submitting multiple requests for consideration by all the attending powers; however, what
gains and losses China actually achieved at this conference lay solely in the compromises
reached between the three key delegations just mentioned. Although the Chinese
delegation spoke powerfully and received favorable comments from many
subcommittees, China’s delegation had minimal to no bargaining power at the conference
itself. 34 The United States, Great Britain, and Japan at the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference did make genuine concessions to China, but they were minor concessions to
assist China in achieving a slightly expanded administrative autonomy over its own
affairs. However, China’s delegates started out seeking much more from this conference,
and their grander aspirations were either denied or twisted to maintain the political,
economic, and territorial privileges already won from China by the other powers in
decades past.
China’s diplomatic aspirations were outlined on 16 November 1921 at the first
meeting of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference. Dr. Soao-Ke Alfred Sze, who was both a
leading member of China’s delegation and China’s minister to the United States 35 ,
presented to the other attending delegates a list of ten “general principles” that the
Chinese government hoped would guide the labors of the conference. Along with this list
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of ten principles, Dr. Sze also presented an explanatory statement that expanded on the
initial themes of the ten principles by providing concrete examples of what China hoped
would be the result of the conference’s decisions. The ten principles were broad in
scope and had they and the suggested concrete reforms been enshrined in treaties,
China’s position in the international community would have been greatly strengthened.
Broadly, the ten principles specified that the other attending powers first respect China’s
territorial and administrative integrity; a second principle was that China would accept
the Open Door concept as the law of commerce for all of China, but in turn the other
powers would include China in any discussions of future treaties that involved it in any
way. Third, China sought open declarations of all treaties previously signed between
itself and the other powers and their re-evaluation. Finally China expected that its rights
as a neutral would be fully respected in future times of war and that future international
issues in the Pacific or in regard to China would be settled in conferences. 36
The ten “general principles” and explanatory statements submitted by Dr. Sze
were written in the hopes of radically redefining China’s domestic powers and
international standing, as well as reducing Japan’s dominating influence within China.
To achieve these three broad ambitions, the Chinese Republic sought to achieve five
practical goals through its “ten principles” at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference: first to
increase governmental revenue to pursue the wars of unification within China, second to
protect Chinese industry from foreign competition, third to regain control of Chinese
tariffs, fourth to institute a universal rule of law upon all individuals residing within
China, and fifth to end spheres of privilege and concession within China held by foreign
nations. These five practical goals were critical to the Chinese Republic because in 1921,
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China was in reality a patchwork of micro-states more than a single nation. China in
1921 was politically and militarily divided due to the various warlords ruling subterritories within China and economically divided due to the extensive spheres of
influence held by foreign powers. Beyond the immediate needs of the Chinese Republic,
the ten principles presented by Dr. Sze were actually an outline defining Chinese national
sovereignty and encapsulating all the powers that define a truly independent and
functional state. Undisputed control over a region of territory politically and militarily,
the ability to regulate its own economy and to control and govern its own means of
production and resources, recognition by other states as an equal: these are the key
powers that define a state and this is what the Chinese Republic sought from the other
powers at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference.
Initially the American delegation at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference had
encouraged the Chinese delegation to outline a series of desired principles to guide the
work of the conference; however, Dr. Sze and the Chinese delegation went too far with
their “ten principles.” The goal of the United States’ delegation at the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference was reform within China, not revolution in the international order. The
United States wanted China opened as a market to the benefit of American enterprise, not
to champion China becoming a new regional Asian power. The “Open Door” principle
was the only “revolutionary” change that the delegation of the United States wanted to
see achieved in China, and this change would also, at least partially, benefit Japan as well
as the other nations in attendance. By allowing open competition and free markets
throughout China, free markets protected from interference by treaty-mandated low
tariffs, the United States sought to increase China’s value economically for all powers
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trading in Asia. Any additional concessions made to the demands of the Chinese
delegation, especially any which threatened Japan’s position within China, could
dangerously destabilize the region, potentially even spark a regional war. It is highly
likely that if Japan’s political and military position in China had been threatened by the
decisions made at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference, its government might have
withdrawn from both conferences and almost certainly would have been far less willing
to adopt treaties opening their concessions to foreign economic competition. The Root
Principles, the initial response of the American delegation to Dr. Sze’s “ten principles,”
sharply curtailed the efforts of the Chinese delegation to spark a radical shift in China’s
international position.
The Root Principles were introduced to the delegates of the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference on 21 November 1921 by their author, the Honorable Elihu Root, former
United States Secretary of State and current Senator of the United States. Mr. Root was a
respected delegate at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference due to his extremely long term
of service in politics and international affairs. Because of his stature, Root was able to
successfully modify Dr. Sze’s initial radical “ten principles.” 37 Root maintained the
philosophic goals of the Chinese delegation but distilled Dr. Sze’s principes to remove
any threat of radical changes by the Far Eastern Affairs Conference to foreign
concessions in China. The initial draft of the Root Principles outlined in four ideas an
ideological framework for the current and future interactions between the attending
delegates’ national governments and the government of China:
37
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…(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial
and administrative integrity of China.
(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to
China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable
government, overcoming the difficulties incident to the change from the
old and long-continued imperial form of government.
(3) To safeguard for the world, so far as is within our power, the principle
of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations
throughout the territory of China.
(4) To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to
seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of the
subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action
inimical to the security of such states. 38
The principles presented by Root in this initial draft were deliberately vague; he
attempted to straddle a line between China’s desire for revolutionary change and the
other nations’ desire for stability of privilege in China. The first and second principles
encompassed the ideal of increased Chinese control over their domestic affairs and a
possible revision of China’s international commitments. The third principle
encompassed the ideals of the Open Door policy for the United States, specifically the
goal of open commerce within China. The fourth principle embraced regional stability in
China, and the Open Door, by specifically forbidding any of the attending nations from
using the current political situation within China to extract any concessions from the
Chinese government that would challenge the rights of other powers within China.
Overall this initial draft form of the Root Principles focused upon economic matters and
maintaining stability in China more than upon revising China’s international position;
however, Root’s principles also offered some opportunity to meet the demands of the
Chinese government for review and revision of its domestic situation. At the very least,
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Root’s initial draft acknowledged that the Chinese delegation’s “ten principles” touched
upon some valid concerns worthy of discussion at the conference.
The other delegates, reacting to their own national interests and the concerns of
the Japanese delegation, as expressed by Baron Kato on 19 November 1921, 39 made
several critical modifications to Root’s proposed principles. Due to these modifications,
the final version of the Root Principles adopted by the Far Eastern Affairs Conference
tightened the broad language in the second and third principles and deliberately focused
the Root Principles solely upon China’s future international relations:
(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and
administrative integrity of China.
(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China
to develop and maintain for herself effective and stable government.
(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and
maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and
industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.
(4) To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to
seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of the
subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical
to the security of such States. 40
By comparing the final version with the original draft version of the Root Principles the
change of intention is clear; the provision in the second principle, that the other powers
needed to remember China’s unique situation due to its imperial legacy, was struck
completely. In essence, by omitting any reference to China’s imperial legacy, the
delegates at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference refused to review China’s past treaties for
purposes of revision; only future Chinese international relations would be discussed at
this conference. The final version of the third clause moved the agreeing nations away
from an expectation of action, “so far as is within our power,” to a more reactive
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expectation that only required the signatory nations to use their “influence” to encourage
other nations and their own nationals to comply with this clause’s terms. However, the
Chinese government’s efforts to have the conference modify past treaties did not end
with this neutered version of the Root Principles; the Chinese delegation attempted past
treaty revision multiple future times during the conference.
The adopted Root Principles were not a radical departure from previous
international diplomacy regarding China; maintaining stability in China was the central
goal of great power diplomacy with China for many previous decades. The Root
Principles were a manifestation of that stability, an agreement between all the powers
with a diplomatic stake in China to work together at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference
to maintain their relative positions of influence within China. The Root Principles set the
stage for a gradual transformation of China, an agreement to create treaties at the
conference that would permit China to loosen some of the constraints upon it due to past
events but only at a pace comfortable to the international powers that in 1921 controlled
China’s destiny. Like all the work undertaken at the conference, these principles, which
were the framework for most of the treaties to follow, maintained stability and protected
the regional status quo. China gained some diplomatic status. Due to the Root
Principles, it would no longer see parts of its territory carved away to be ruled under
special “agreements” with other powers. China, though, did not gain all it desired from
the Root Principles; the desire of its republican government to control China’s economic
destiny was not granted at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference.
Inspired by the first Root Principle, the Far Eastern Affairs Conference delegates
adopted two minor resolutions that immediately expanded the Chinese republic’s
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domestic autonomy: an agreement to cede to China’s control unauthorized foreign radio
stations located within China and a second agreement ending foreign private postal
services operating within China. These two treaties were mainly political in focus but
also represented a minor economic concession to the Chinese republic; by allowing China
to gain control over foreign held radio stations and ending private postal services, the
other powers returned to China two concessions that could be harnessed as minor sources
of governmental revenue. Mainly, though, these two accords served as recognition by the
other powers that the newly established republican government of China would be able to
maintain law and order within its territory and that regular postal service and regular
radio communication networks could operate uninterrupted. However, even these minor
concessions were not unconditional and carried with them requirements that limited
China’s freedom of action in taking advantage of her newly gained administrative
control.
The resolution ceding to China control over unauthorized foreign radio stations
was adopted by the Far Eastern Affairs Conference on 7 December 1921 and signed by
the attending powers on 6 February 1922 without modification. This resolution had five
articles that outlined the new position of the various foreign owned radio stations within
China. The treaty specified first that all radio stations attached to any legations or
granted by the International Protocol of 7 September 1901 would be used for only official
broadcasts required by the owning legation and would avoid making any commercial
broadcasts unless Chinese commercial radio communications were temporarily disrupted.
Second, the treaty required that communications by any other authorized foreign radio
stations should be limited to the traffic allowed by the governing treaty that originally
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authorized that radio station. Third, the treaty permitted the Chinese government to
acquire control of unauthorized foreign radio stations within its territory by purchasing
them, a topic to be explored in more detail momentarily. Fourth, the treaty specified that
any issues involving radio stations in the South Manchurian railway zone or within the
French concession in Shanghai would be resolved by direct negotiation between the
government in question and the Chinese government. The fifth and final term of the
treaty specified that all foreign radio station operators would work with the Chinese
Republican government to establish broadcasting standards to avoid overlapping radio
frequencies. 41
The third clause of this treaty, which permitted the Chinese government to
purchase unauthorized foreign radio stations, is worth a closer examination:
3. In case there be any radio station maintained in the territory of China
by a foreign government or citizens of subjects thereof without the
authority of the Chinese Government, such station and all the plant
apparatus and material thereof shall be transferred to and taken over by
the Government of China to be operated under the direction of the Chinese
Ministry of Communications upon fair and full compensations to the owners
for the value of the installation, as soon as the Chinese Ministry of
Communications is prepared to operate the same effectively for the general
public benefit. 42
This clause is vital because it reveals how constrained this concession actually was due to
its requirement that the republican Chinese government buy any unauthorized radio
station from its foreign owners at market value and that the Chinese government must
then allow the radio station to remain open to public use. The power to domestically
license and control access to radio communications was an autonomous power of
governments that was well established by 1921. This clause, instead of allowing the
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Chinese government even that minor concession of sovereignty, only allowed the
Chinese government to regulate radio stations within its own territory and only to the
extent that the government could purchase the privilege. In reality this clause only
allowed minor changes to the existing status quo of communications within China, one of
which was transfers of ownership. This treaty, like many others signed at the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference, maintained stability within China and avoided even minor changes
within China that might disrupt great power privileges or China’s value to others as an
area of investment and commerce.
Regarding the various great power private postal services, the Chinese delegation
won one of the few almost unconditional diplomatic victories for China. The agreement
ending private postal services was introduced earlier than the agreement on foreign
owned radio stations but was ratified later, on 12 December 1921, due to the Japanese
government delaying its agreement over the matter of the date of transfer of full postal
authority to the Chinese republican government. On 28 November 1921 Henry Cabot
Lodge, United States Senator and member of the American delegation43 , presented to the
fully assembled delegates of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference the resolution ending
private foreign postal services within China, provided that a few key conditions were first
met. Those conditions were:
a. That an efficient Chinese postal service is maintained.
b. That an assurance is given by the Chinese Government that they
contemplate no change in the present postal administration so far as the
status of the foreign Co-Director General is concerned. 44
Additionally, during the period of transition when the agreeing four foreign powers
transferred their private postal services to the Chinese government, the Chinese Customs
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authorities would be given assistance in inspecting incoming mail to the private postal
system for contraband, excepting “ordinary letters” that “upon examination contain only
written matter.” What makes this treaty a real diplomatic victory for the Chinese
government, even with the restrictions above, is twofold: first, the other attending powers
agreed to give up something without any compensation or reward. Great Britain, France,
Japan, and the United States agreed to give up their private postal services in full on 1
January 1923. 45 Second, this treaty actually changed the status quo within China; the
Chinese government successfully assumed full control of the postal services and was able
to exercise, in a singular field of governmental enterprise, unmitigated power within its
own nation. Unfortunately for China’s ambitions these two treaties, foreign radio stations
and foreign postal services, were the largest grants of autonomy given to the Chinese
government at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference.
One of the major goals of the Chinese government at the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference was to regain control over its tariff policies, in particular the ability to set its
own tariff rates and schedules on imports and exports. In 1921, China’s tariffs were fixed
by a series of external treaties at five percent per annum on both incoming goods and
exports; however, the price schedules upon which these rates were based were outmoded
by 1921. Due to the fixed low rate of tariffs and the undervalued price schedules, the
Chinese government had severe difficulties raising effective tax revenue from its foreign
trade. The Chinese delegation submitted its request for tariff autonomy on 22 November
1921, and on 5 January 1922 the subcommittee studying the issue recommended to the
Far Eastern Affairs Conference delegates that no change be made in how China’s tariffs
were controlled. The conference delegates went further than their subcommittee
45
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recommended; the terms extended to China to “reform” its tariff situation in 1922 were
actually harsher then the tariff terms China operated under prior to the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference. 46
The new Chinese tariff treaty adopted by the delegates at the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference modified China’s tax systems and allowed for an update to the tariff
schedules, but did not allow any change to the tariff rates. Under this new universal
treaty, China was first required to abolish entirely a transit tax on goods moved internally
through China, the likin tax, removing one source of revenue for the Chinese government.
Second, the tariff rate for China was to remain at five percent on all imported and
exported goods; however, the schedule of prices upon which the duties were based was to
be revised. Third, until the schedule of prices was corrected, the Chinese government
would be allowed to increase the tariff on incoming goods temporarily two and one half
percent. Fourth, the temporary limited tariff increase, the new tariff price schedule, and
the abolition of likin were all to be planned by an appointed international oversight
committee. Fifth and finally, the treaty required that the five percent Chinese tariff be
applied equally on all Chinese foreign trade and that the Chinese government enforce
uniformity in tariff collection on all of its borders. The requirement of uniformity in
tariff collection allowed for limited variations based on local economic considerations but
was in place to force the central Chinese government to discourage local officials from
modifying the tariffs. The treaty did require regular revisions of the fixed tariff price
schedule, in contrast to previous tariff treaties, but the revision schedule was rigid
because it allowed the tariff rates to be recalculated only once every seven years. 47

46
47

Levermore, League of Nations, 276 – 277.
Levermore, League of Nations, 332 – 335.

40

The Chinese tariff treaty created at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was a
major diplomatic loss for the Chinese government and a major diplomatic victory for the
other attending powers and the principle of regional economic stability. By maintaining
the Chinese tariff at a fixed five percent rate, the other attending powers ensured that
China would remain highly attractive as a market for foreign trade. In addition, by
denying the Chinese republican government the ability to modify its tariffs, this treaty
ensured trade stability and further promoted the plan of the American delegation to
enshrine the American Open Door policy in China into a formal universal treaty
structure. Any preferential tariff system is anathema to the concept of a free and open
Chinese market that was desired by the American government, and this tariff treaty was a
major necessary step to create and protect the open market ideal. The extent of this
diplomatic defeat to the Chinese government is best illustrated in terms of tax revenues.
Had the conference accorded to the Chinese government its originally requested tariff
rates of twelve and one-half percent, the Chinese government would have gained
approximately 300,000,000.00 additional dollars in annual tax revenue. The new
universal Chinese tariff treaty, due to the revised tariff schedule, would give the Chinese
government only approximately $46,000,000.00 in additional tax revenue annually.
Factoring in the loss of revenue due to the abolition of the likin tax, the final real tax
revenue gained by the Chinese government from these new accords was only around
$19,000,000.00 annually, a fraction of the revenue needed by the Chinese republican
government to effectively end China’s low intensity civil war. 48
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The Open Door in China treaty ratified at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was
the final extension of a policy pursued by the government of the United States since the
1890s, a policy ensuring that China would be equally open to the commerce of all
nations. The government of the United States was interested in achieving this goal
mainly for the benefit of American foreign trade, but as a secondary benefit it could also
enhance other nations’ trade within China as well. The concept of the Open Door policy
was first outlined by the United States in 1899 in a diplomatic note to the governments of
Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia:
(1) That it will in no wise interfere with any treaty port or any vested

interest within any so-called ‘spheres of interest’ or leased territories it
may have in China.
(2) That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all
merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports within such ‘spheres of
influence’ (unless they be ‘free ports’), no matter to what nationality it may
belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese
Government.
(3) That it will levy no higher harbour dues on vessels of another nationality
frequenting any port in such ‘spheres’ than shall be levied on vessels of its
own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or
operated within its ‘sphere’ on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects
of other nationalities transported through the ‘sphere’ than shall be levied on
similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal
distances 49
From its initial proposal on 6 September 1899 to the start of the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference in 1921, the United States gained gradual, shifting consent from the other
nations for this proposed policy. By the start of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference the
Open Door policy supported by the United States was not enshrined in a universal treaty,
instead it was based on a ramshackle series of diplomatic notes between other powers and
the United States, notes riddled with exceptions and exclusions. From 16 – 18 January
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1922 the American delegation at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference successfully ended
this ramshackle system and replaced it with a new universal Open Door treaty for
China. 50
The original proposed Open Door treaty suggested by the American delegation
and introduced by Secretary of State Charles Hughes laid out four key principles that
were to define a new codified Open Door policy in China. The cornerstone of this new
universal Open Door policy was outlined in the first proposed principle:
(A) Not to seek, or to support their nationals in seeking, any arrangement
which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general
superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development
in any designated region of China.
(B) Not to seek or to support their nationals in seeking any such monopoly
or preferences as would deprive other nationals of the right of undertaking
any legitimate trade or industry in China or of participating with the Chinese
Government or with any provincial government in any category of public
enterprise, which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is
calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal
opportunity. 51
This two-paragraph understanding was a masterpiece of commercial and political
diplomacy by the American delegation, first because it created a uniform definition of the
Open Door policy that all the attending great powers found agreeable and second, and
more critically, because it also allowed the commerce of the United States, along with the
commerce of other nations, access to China’s markets without the expense or political
dangers of carving out spheres of influence. This treaty clause, in combination with the
tariff treaty, transformed China into a single free market commercial entity and moved
international competition in China away from solely political and military influence into
the realm of commercial influence as well. This treaty clause also opened the way for the
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United States, as a major competitive trading power within China, to assert economic and
commercial dominance through its own expanding economic power in 1922. This part of
the Open Door treaty did not directly challenge the political status quo within China;
instead, it allowed the existing economic balance of power between the great powers in
China to become more fluid.
The second and third clauses of the Open Door treaty for China were relatively
straightforward. The second clause established the Chinese republican government’s
willingness to abide by the terms of the first clause of the treaty. The third clause
stipulated that an international board of reference would be created and empowered to
review any claims of violations of this treaty. The proposed fourth clause of this treaty,
however, raised considerable concern among the other delegations; the opposition to this
clause was strong enough that the American delegation eventually had to accede to its
removal to get the Open Door treaty approved. This controversial fourth clause stated
that:
IV. The Powers, including China, represented at this conference agree
that any provisions of an existing concession which appear inconsistent with
those of another concession or with the principles of the above agreement or
declaration may be submitted by the parties concerned to the board of reference,
when established, for the purpose of endeavoring to arrive at a satisfactory
adjustment on equitable terms. 52
The French and Japanese delegations strongly opposed this proposal because it could
have disrupted their existing concessions and economic agreements within China
established prior to the Far Eastern Affairs Conference. Considering the wording of the
clause above, specifically the stated focus upon any “existing concession,” the intent by
the American delegation that this clause would have been used to modify existing
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concessions that limited the commerce of the United States is obvious. At the
recommendation of the Canadian delegation the fourth clause was struck, tempering the
diplomatic victory of the United States. The future of commerce in China would be, in
principle, open to all nations equally, but previously established concessions would
remain protected from the open and equal competition desired by the United States.
Market access within China reaches to the heart of one of the issues the Far
Eastern Affairs Conference was focused upon. It was a cornerstone of the disagreements
between the governments of the United States and Japan. For the Japanese government,
it was a matter of policy that China was to become a market dominated by Japanese
commerce. Chinese raw materials were to be used to fuel the Japanese economy, and
China’s growing consumer demands were to be met by Japanese manufactured goods.
The Japanese government’s territorial concessions in China came from two major
sources, its victories in its 19th century wars with China and as a reward for Japan’s
loyalty to the Allied cause in the First World War. However, the Japanese positions in
China ran to a deeper ideological current than just political and diplomatic gains.
Japanese citizens had settled and invested in Manchuria, and Japan sought to protect and
expand those interests as a matter of national policy. 53 The government of the United
States wished to follow its long established policy of expanding its national commerce
freely throughout China. The inherent conflict between this position and the Japanese
government’s position could have led to violent confrontation between the two powers.
The Open Door treaty and tariff treaty, though, forged a successful compromise between
American and Japanese ambitions, defusing the potential for conflict and promoting
stability, at least through the 1920s.
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One of the major goals of the Chinese republican government at the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference was to achieve an agreement that all future treaties involving China
would be written with the participation of the Chinese government in their negotiation.
Pragmatically the Chinese government also sought the lesser goal at the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference of the publication of all previous and present agreements between the
Chinese government and other powers of any sort. The Chinese formally requested on 8
December 1921 that the other attending powers agree to the principle that no treaties
should be created in the future that related to China without the participation of the
Chinese government. This initiative was challenged by the Japanese and British
delegations with the argument that if granted it would impinge too greatly on the
sovereignty of action of other nations. Rather than the principle sought by the Chinese
delegation, the conference delegates resolved:
That the Powers attending this Conference, hereinafter mentioned, to wit,
the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal declare that it is their intention not
to enter into any treaty with one another or individually or collectively, with
any Power or Powers which would infringe or impair the principles which
have been declared by the resolution adopted on November 21 by this
Committee. 54
The effort by the Chinese delegation to have the other attending powers agree not to
negotiate treaties about China without the participation of the Chinese government was
rewarded only with a pledge by the other powers that they would not violate their
previous pledges at this conference in future treaties. 55
On 19 January 1922 Charles Hughes, United States delegate, proposed that all the
attending nations at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference agree to publicly list all treaties
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and agreements, past and present, that existed between their governments and/or
nationals and the nation of China. The proposal, in this form, was enthusiastically
supported by the Chinese delegation but met with resistance from the other delegates
attending the conference. The British and Japanese delegations stated that their
governments lacked the necessary records to meet this proposal, and the French
delegation stated that France had already fully published all its commitments with China
in the past. On 20 and 21 January 1922 this issue was debated; the Japanese delegation
led the resistance to this proposal on the grounds that any treaty requiring private citizens
to divulge their agreements with the Chinese government was improper and violated their
citizens’ rights. The Japanese delegation’s complaint on this matter was supported by the
British delegation, which protested that it was “unfair to compel business men to divulge
the terms of contracts.”56
A compromise was reached on 21 January 1922 that placed the burden of
publishing the text of all past and present agreements between China and others upon the
Chinese government, rather than as a shared responsibility of all the attending nations.
This minor change represented the greatest setback to this initiative, because by requiring
the government of China to publish future treaties, this agreement diplomatically
weakened the Chinese government. This proposal removed from China the chance of
private diplomacy unless it violated the concessions it had fought for at the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference, and it also made future open diplomacy more easily subject to
political pressure from other powers. By forcing the Chinese government to publish past
treaties, the compromise resolution did nothing new. It required China to reveal what
treaties it could have already revealed but added no new material that might have sparked
56
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a great power drive for a broader review of former Chinese treaties. 57 By indirect means
such as these used to block China’s Open Diplomacy proposals, the Japanese delegation
avoided challenges to Japan’s position within China. It was one of the goals of the Far
Eastern Affairs Conference delegates to avoid destabilizing the situation in China, so no
challenges were raised to this sort of side-stepping by the Japanese government.
One of the major practical goals pursued by the Chinese republican government at
the conference was to have the international oversight on domestic Chinese railroads
ended or reformed to allow the Chinese government greater control over China’s solely
internal railroads. The Far Eastern Affairs Conference delegates passed only two broad
resolutions on the subject of China’s railroad system; neither resolution addressed who
would have immediate administration over China’s railroads. Instead, the conference
delegates first created a resolution that applied the principles of the Open Door policy to
railroad rates and railroad operations throughout China:
I. The Chinese Government declares that throughout the whole of the
railways in China, it will not exercise or permit any unfair discrimination
of any kind. In particular there shall be no discrimination whatever, direct
or indirect, in respect to charges or of facilities on the ground of the
nationality of passengers or the countries from which or to which they are
proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the country from which or
to which they are consigned, or the nationality or ownership of the ship or
other means of conveying such passengers or goods before or after their transport
on the Chinese railways.
The other Powers represented at this conference take note of the above
declaration and make a corresponding declaration in respect of any of the
aforesaid railways over which they or their nationals are in a position to
exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement or
otherwise. 58
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This first resolution clearly limited the power of the Chinese government, along with
other signatory powers, to actually regulate the rates of shipping or transit in any manner
that could unfavorably affect free trade. In essence this resolution was an extension of
the earlier restrictions preventing the Chinese government from assuming control over
import tariffs because this resolution blocked any effort by the Chinese government to
shelter its domestic industry or create economic favoritism for any particular nation by
manipulating freight rates. The second railroad resolution agreed to by the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference delegates stated the hope that all future railroad development in China
would be undertaken to achieve the future goal of a centralized railway system
administered solely by the Chinese government. This resolution, though, was careful to
state that such an objective should only be pursued with respect to currently existing
agreements regarding Chinese railways and that China, when building its national rail
system, would seek out “…such foreign financial and technical assistance as may prove
necessary in the interests of that system.” 59
The other major railroad issue resolved by the Far Eastern Affairs Conference
dealt with the strategically important Eastern Chinese Railroad, a railroad that linked the
South Manchurian and Trans-Siberian railroads into one unified system. The Eastern
Chinese Railroad originally operated under Russian control, but during World War I
administrative control over this vital railroad was transferred to an inter-allied
commission. The Eastern Chinese Railroad faced severe financial difficulties during its
World War I operations and by 1921 was also plagued with service interruptions. The
conference, after reviewing the request by the Chinese delegation that control of this
railroad be given to the Chinese republican government, instead resolved to place a new
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international commission in charge of administering the railroad, the composition of
which was to be resolved later. The Chinese government would be granted only limited
administrative control on aspects of the Eastern Chinese Railroad’s operations. However,
after granting this minor concession, the other delegates added a reservation:
The Powers other than China in agreeing to the resolution regarding the
Chinese Eastern Railway reserve the right to insist hereafter upon the
responsibilities of China for performance or non-performance of the
obligations toward the foreign stockholders, bondholders and creditors of
the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which the holders deem to result
from the contracts under which the railroad was built and the obligations
which they deem to be in the nature of a trust resulting from the exercise of
power by the Chinese Government over the possession and administration of
the railroad. 60
More simply, the international loans that were part of the reason the Eastern Chinese
Railroad could not operate profitably were not to be excused or renegotiated, and the
Chinese government was expected, in exchange for gaining partial administrative control,
to also assume the obligation of meeting the scheduled payments on the loans. Some
contemporary analysts saw this resolution and reservation as merely an effort by the other
delegates at the conference to prevent the Japanese government from gaining political
control over the Eastern Chinese Railroad and therefore further strengthening Japan’s
position in Manchuria, which might in turn have further degraded regional stability.61
Another major goal of the Chinese government at the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference was to get the other attending powers to pledge to remove all foreign troops,
excluding those that were part of an embassy’s diplomatic guard, permanently from
Chinese soil. This request by the Chinese government was mainly aimed at Japan, due to
the large number of Japanese military and police forces stationed within the Shantung
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peninsula and Southern Manchuria. On 28 – 29 November 1921 Dr. Sze, head of the
Chinese delegation, reported to the Far Eastern Affairs Conference that as of 1921 the
Japanese government had more than 16,000 soldiers and police stationed in the Chinese
mainland, more than ten times any other power’s non-legation forces. The Japanese
delegation refused to remove its military forces within China due to “banditry” within
China and Manchuria and refused to remove its police forces because they were
necessary to maintain law and order in Manchuria among Japanese citizens. Due to
extraterritoriality, Chinese courts and police could not enforce the law when the violators
were Japanese citizens. No other attending powers with troops in China entered a formal
explanation for their military forces in China or ever offered to remove their non-legation
military forces. 62
The Chinese government’s request that foreign troops be removed from Chinese
soil was finally resolved with the adoption by the Far Eastern Affairs Conference of two
resolutions. The first pledged the attending powers to withdraw any foreign troops
present in China not authorized by any treaty and stationed in areas where the Chinese
government could protect its citizens. The second resolution pledged the attending
governments to:
…associate themselves with three representatives of the Chinese
government to conduct collectively a full and impartial inquiry into the
issues raised by the foregoing declarations of intention made by the
Powers and by China and shall thereafter prepare a full and comprehensive
report setting out without reservation their findings of fact and their opinion
with regard to the matter hereby referred for inquiry and shall furnish a copy
of their report to each of the nine Governments concerned which shall
severally make public the report with such comment as each may deem
appropriate. The representatives of any of the Powers may make or join in
any minority reports stating their differences, if any, from the majority report
That each of the Powers above named shall be deemed free to accept
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or reject any of the findings of fact or opinions expressed in the report but
that in no case shall any of the said Powers make its acceptance of all or any
of the findings of fact or opinions either directly or indirectly dependent on
the granting by China of any special concession, favor, benefit or immunity,
whether political or economic. 63
This resolution did not pledge the signatory Powers to any concrete action; instead they
pledged merely to engage in a fact finding mission upon the request of the Chinese
government. The value of the powers even agreeing to meet with the Chinese
government on this issue was minimal, as the committee meeting did not need to agree on
a single report; each government receiving the report could modify it as they wished, and
no government was bound to take any action based upon the contents of the report.
However, because the resolution required all the powers to publish the final version of
the report publicly and share it with the other signatory powers, it pushed the issue into
the sphere of public diplomacy where popular pressure might force governments to
change policy. This resolution did not in and of itself challenge the military situation in
China; therefore, it met one of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference’s goals to maintain the
status quo within China. But it also placed at least one issue regarding China under the
influence of public opinion, evidence of a slight shift in the attitude of the attending
governments in the method by which diplomatic changes could be pursued.
The final major concession requested by the Chinese government at the Far
Eastern Affairs Conference was over the issue of extraterritoriality. In 1921 the Chinese
government did not have judicial authority over most foreign citizens living within China
due to concessions granted by China to other powers in previous treaties. On 16
November 1921 the Chinese delegation requested that the Far Eastern Affairs Conference
address the issue of extraterritoriality within China, and by 29 November 1921 a
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resolution was adopted by the conference on the issue. The resolution began with a series
of preliminary statements that outlined the desire of the other powers to see China
achieve a judicial system equal to that of “Western nations” and pledging the other
signatory powers to the cause of helping China achieve an end to extraterritoriality. The
key clauses of the resolution pledged that:
…the Governments of the Powers above named [United States of
America, Belgium, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands and Portugal] shall establish a commission (to which each
of such Governments shall appoint one member) to inquire into the laws
and the judicial system and the methods of judicial administration of China,
with a view to reporting to the Governments of the several Powers above
named in their findings of fact in regard to these matters, and their
recommendations as to such means as they may find suitable to improve the
existing conditions of the administration of justice in China, and to assist and
further the efforts of the Chinese Government to effect such legislation and
judicial reforms as would warrant the several Powers in relinquishing, either
progressively or otherwise, their respective rights of extraterritoriality;
That the Commission herein contemplated shall be constituted within three
months after the adjournment of the Conference, with detailed arrangements
to be hereafter agreed upon by the Governments of the Powers above named,
and shall be instructed to submit its report and resolutions within one year after
the first meeting of the committee;
That each of the Powers above named shall be deemed free to accept or to
reject all or any portion of the recommendations of the committee herein
contemplated, but that in no case shall any of the said Powers make its
acceptance of all or any part of such recommendations either directly or
indirectly dependent on the granting by China of any special concession,
favor, benefit or immunity, whether political or economic. 64
The conference delegates later extended to the Chinese government the right to appoint a
representative to the proposed commission to review the Chinese judicial system. The
attending delegates also formally issued a statement that the signatory powers were
“sympathetic” to the goal of ending the practice of extraterritoriality within China. 65
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The main terms of this resolution mirrored those written to resolve the issue of
foreign troops upon Chinese soil, mainly setting up a special investigatory commission.
Once more by making the work of this commission advisory and also by not binding any
government to use the commission’s findings, this resolution was pragmatically of
minimal value. This resolution did not even hold out the opportunity of a moral victory
for the Chinese government by having the issue of extraterritoriality debated on the
public stage like the issue of foreign troops in China; no requirement was included in this
resolution that the findings of this commission ever be made public.
As an interesting follow-up, this commission did meet, later than the pledged date
at the conference at the request of the Chinese government, but in December 1925 the
Chinese government invited delegates from the signatory powers to form the commission
of study on extraterritoriality. The commission began its work on 12 January 1926,
which included a tour of the Chinese judicial system in action in various provinces, and
completed its report on 16 September 1926. The report was extensive in its
recommendations but in the end had no significant impact. The Chinese government did
not implement the suggested reforms and no signatory powers ended their privileges of
extraterritoriality in the 1920s. 66
The Chinese delegation achieved one of its major goals for modification of the
status quo in China while the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was meeting, the negotiated
return of the Shantung peninsula to China by Japan; this major diplomatic goal was
achieved during the Far Eastern Affairs Conference but outside of the conference itself.
The Chinese and Japanese delegations met in private negotiations, facilitated by
representatives from the British and United States delegations, from 30 November 1921
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until 1 February 1922. These negotiations between Japan and China were acrimonious
and broke down multiple times; negotiations only moved forward when members of the
United States Senate on 20 January 1922 threatened to block the Washington Naval
Conference’s naval arms reduction treaty being ratified by the United States until the
Shantung issue was resolved. The Shantung peninsula issues began due to territorial
seizures made by Japan of Germany’s concessions within China during World War I and
the subsequent recognition of these territorial transfers by the Versailles Treaty in 1919.
The specific territorial grant made to Japan in 1919 was Germany’s lease of the KiaoChau region within Shantung, a vital port of trade and concentration of industry for
Shantung, as well as Germany’s leases on the railroads and other infrastructure within the
Shantung province. 67
The terms of the treaty successfully negotiated to return the leased Shantung
holdings were generally not favorable to the Chinese government. The core of the
agreement was that Japan would return the territory of Kiao-Chau to Chinese
administrative control within six months of the ratification of the treaty. The Chinese
government agreed to pay Japan the full value for any improvements made to public
structures within the territory since its occupation by Japan in 1915, but no other
compensation would be demanded of the Chinese government for these structures. Japan
agreed to a full withdrawal of all its military and police forces from the Kiao-Chau region
within six months of the signing of the treaty or, if possible, within three months of that
date, dependent upon the Chinese government being able to police the territory
effectively. China agreed to purchase the Shantung railway system, referred to in the
treaty as the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway, for a price to be assessed by an international
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commission, and China also agreed that any future expansion of this railway system
would be open to international financing. Japanese-owned mines within the region
would be opened to partial Chinese ownership on the understanding that Japanese capital
within the mines would not exceed Chinese capital within the mines. Japan yielded
without charge to the Chinese government two of the submarine cables located in the
Shantung waters and built by Germany but retained a third cable for its own strategic
purposes. An interesting oddity of the treaty was that the Chinese government would be
allowed to buy from private Japanese owners the salt works in Shantung, on the condition
that Japan would receive a certain annual shipment of salt from China. 68
One clause of the treaty is of considerable interest because it reflects one of the
larger themes of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference as a whole:
The Japanese government declares that it has no intention of seeking
the establishment of an exclusive Japanese settlement or of an
international settlement in Tsingtao.
The Chinese government, on its part, declares that the entire area of the
former German leased territory of Kiao-Chau will be opened to foreign
trade, and that foreigners will be permitted to freely reside and to carry
on commerce, industry and other lawful pursuits within such area.
The vested rights lawfully and equitably acquired by foreign nationals
in said area, whether under the German regime or during the Japanese
military occupation, will be respected.
All questions relating to the status or validity of such vested rights
acquired by Japanese nationals shall be arranged by the Sino-Japanese
Joint Commission. 69
This particular clause, titled “Opening of the Former German Leased Territory,” is
noteworthy because it reaffirms once more the idea of the Open Door within China. This
newly transferred territory, like the rest of China, was required by the principles agreed to
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at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference to be open to foreign trade and commerce, a
concession keenly appreciated by the American delegation in particular. The terms of the
treaty that covered the transfer were honored by both parties; six months after the
conclusion of the treaty, Japan withdrew its garrison and gave administrative control of
the territory in full to the Chinese government. 70
The Chinese delegation asked the other attending powers to consider ending their
standing leases of Chinese territory at the same time as it announced that Japan was
conceding the Shantung territories back to the Chinese government. The other attending
powers with holdings in China responded in a generally positive manner. The French
delegation pledged to join in any “collective restoration of territories leased to various
powers in China” subject to successful negotiations between each power and the Chinese
government to settle the terms of territorial adjustments. The Japanese delegation
declined to consider returning any further leased territory in China held by the Japanese
government, with a particular emphasis upon maintaining its holdings in Manchuria.
Finally the British delegation offered to return to China the British leased Wei-hai-wei
territory but at the same time declined to return Kowloon, as the territory was considered
vital to the defense of Hong Kong. 71 None of the territorial transfers offered by the
British or French delegation occurred during the conference or in its immediate
aftermath. By the 1930s no further leases on Chinese territory had been ended
voluntarily by France, Britain, or Japan. Even outside the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference, the status quo in China was maintained. 72
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The various accords, resolutions, and sub-treaties were brought together into two
omnibus treaties at the end of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference: the Nine-Power Treaty
on the Open Door in China and the Chinese Tariff Treaty. Both were ratified by the sixth
general delegates’ assembly on 4 February 1922. As their titles imply, these two treaties
formally stated the agreements that had been the central diplomatic aims of the American
delegation at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference: the agreements to fix China’s internal
and external tariffs, ban lichen taxes (the internal trade tariffs on goods moved within
China), and establish an equal field for international commerce within China. The
conference also formally adopted six resolutions on 4 February 1922 that were discussed
earlier and addressed topics ranging from the administration of China’s railways to
extraterritoriality to the presence of foreign military and police forces within China.
The Far Eastern Affairs Conference concluded formally on 6 February 1922, with
the signatory ceremonies on the treaties and a concluding address by the President of
United States, Warren G. Harding. Included in the formal final records of the conference
was a full listing of the treaties and resolutions adopted by the conference and agreed
upon by the various attending nations; all the resolutions and treaties outlined in this
treatise were proudly listed as significant diplomatic accomplishments by the conference
delegates. 73 In many ways the delegates attending the Far Eastern Affairs Conference
had every right to take pride in their labors; several major agreements settling challenging
issues had been concluded after long and acrimonious debate. The future position of
China within the international framework of nations seemed settled; more critically, it
seemed that the originally irreconcilable positions of the Chinese and Japanese
governments over the future shape of China had been brought to mutual compromise.
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However this same conference had not radically changed the situation within China nor
addressed the new Chinese government’s hopes for a radical re-evaluation of China’s
international position. Instead, the conference had focused on assuring that stability in
the Far East would be maintained ahead of any potentially destabilizing reforms.
The Chinese government came to the Far Eastern Affairs Conference hoping to
lay out a framework for a Chinese revolution. The Chinese delegation initially presented
a list of ten ideals and ten elaborations which, had they been adopted as written, would
have transformed China into an independent and potentially powerful nation. Certainly
had all the changes requested by China at the conference been adopted, the new Chinese
republican government would have found itself, for the first time in over fifty years of
Chinese history, as a Chinese government with complete command of China’s finances,
armies, and traditional national territories. The newly established Chinese government
thus empowered would have found itself master of a vastly increased national treasury,
freed of many onerous treaties, and able to press its dominance upon the various militant
warlords still resisting its authority within China. It is probable that had the original ten
ideals outlined by the Chinese delegation been fully and honestly met at the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference, the course of history in the 1920s and 1930s in Asia, and from that
possibly the world, would have been radically different. But these ten ideals did not
spark a revolution of China’s position on the international scene; instead they provided a
framework for the conference’s work and documented the dreams of nationalist China.
Within them were encapsulated the problems and challenges that left China weak,
divided, and vulnerable to external ambitions. These same national weaknesses
eventually led to China becoming the victim of Japanese aggression in the early 1930s.
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Had the Far Eastern Affairs Conference adopted much of the Chinese
government’s idealized vision for China, it is certain the Japanese delegation would have
left the conference, and it is possible that a Sino-Japanese war might have occurred in the
1920s. To achieve a desired international stability and to ensure the participation of the
Japanese government in the arms reduction treaties being negotiated at the Washington
Naval Conference, the idealized goals of China had to be tempered, contained, and
molded at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference to fit the realities of the situation. For the
Japanese delegation, containing the ambitions of China’s republican government was a
critical goal due to the high level of political capital invested by Japan in China.
However, Japan was not alone in this goal; all the attending great power delegations, for
their own individual reasons, sought to keep China’s ambitions at the conference limited.
Overall China came to the Far Eastern Affairs Conference hoping to redefine its position
within the international community of nations; it left the conference with its position only
marginally changed.
The Chinese government did achieve a few minimal gains at the conference. First
it was able to get solid agreements from the attending great powers to transfer all
unauthorized foreign-held wireless stations to Chinese governmental control, with
suitable compensation for the stations’ owners. Second, the other attending great powers
agreed to end a patchwork system of foreign private postal services within China and
transfer to the Chinese government total control of the mail. Both of these concessions
slightly increased China’s recognized autonomy because by ceding limited control over
communications, the other attending powers accorded to the Chinese government actual
power over one aspect of statecraft. Despite the hopes of the Chinese republican
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government, it was not given control over China’s trade tariffs. Instead, China was
forced to abide by earlier externally limited tariffs on imports and exports. Although a
revision of the tables of taxation was permitted, the Far Eastern Affairs Conference by
treaty ensured that China was to remain an economically open market for foreign imports
and exports. China’s position as an open market to all foreign commerce was ensured by
the Open Door treaty, which codified previous loose diplomatic understandings into a
single firm international agreement. Considering that the conference made no effort to
immediately revise extraterritoriality, remove foreign troops in China, or grant the
Chinese governmental oversight of the railroads located within China, the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference was quite harsh, leaving the new Chinese republican government in a
position little better than when it entered the conference.
The new republican government of China went into the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference hoping to achieve control over three major aspects of statecraft, control over
its own internal administration, sole power of force within its territories, and control of its
own national finances. With only limited concrete gains on the first goal, promises of
review on the second goal, and no gains at all on the third goal, the Chinese government
left the Far Eastern Affairs Conference no stronger. But for other attending powers, the
Far Eastern Affairs Conference was a success because Chinese ambitions were contained
and the conference settled potential issues in China that might have sparked great power
conflict or destabilized the region. The treaties and resolutions settled at the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference first expanded the value of China as a market for foreign trade and
investment. As for Japan, the conference removed their government’s fear that previous
treaties signed between Japan and China that had provided advantages to Japan within
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China, and acknowledged Japan’s economic and political position within Manchuria,
would be challenged by the other powers. This concession to the Japanese government recognition of its special place in China - was necessary so that the Japanese government
would, in turn, cooperate with the work of the Washington Naval Conference.
Most critically though, the Far Eastern Affairs Conference stabilized the one
region of the world within which in 1921 rebellion, revolt, or conflict might have
escalated into a wider war. The major goal of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was to
provide a framework of treaties and resolutions within which China could continue to
exist as a sovereign nation but also ensure that this sovereign China could threaten no
other nation’s position or gains within China. The conference delegates masterfully
achieved this goal, defusing any danger of the new Chinese government drastically
undermining the status quo in China and winning the support of the Japanese delegation
for the other work of the conference. On a broader scale, the overall work of the
Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was to maintain
the standing world order and reduce the capacity of the attending nations to wage
aggressive war. Removing some of the potential causes of war over privileges in China
and Chinese ambitions for change was vital to these goals. The treaties that will be
discussed in the next chapter, that reduced naval arms and modified the rules of war,
directly hinged upon the work completed at the same time on issues in China. The longterm legacy of the work of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was minimal; none of the
accords survived the cauldron of World War II, but two legacies of this conference did
impact future events.
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First, the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was the first time in more than fifty
years that a Chinese delegation was permitted to negotiate with the other Great Powers
rather than simply being forced to accept a new treaty without commentary. This
acknowledgement by the Great Powers of the growing need to negotiate with China to
make treaties represented the beginning of a trend that future events would make a
requirement. As the 1920s and 1930s drew to a close, China’s national strength grew, a
general trend that continued in the decades following World War II, ending with China
being recognized as a new Great Power due to its self-achieved growth in national
strength and ability. Second, the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was the first attempt by
the great powers to recognize that a rising national force needed to be accorded some
autonomy, that a nation of those who had been ruled by others in the past might, in the
twentieth century, need to be given some respect. As such the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference can be seen as one of the first sparks of the future decolonization movements
of the post-World War II decades that would radically change the world.
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THE WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE
In contrast to the Far Eastern Affairs Conference, the Washington Naval
Conference focused upon a more pragmatic, action-oriented agenda. The Washington
Naval Conference proper began on 12 November 1922 and concluded on 6 February
1923 when, with full ceremony, two treaties were signed that sealed the balance of power
between the signatories for a decade. The first of these treaties, the Four-Power Treaty,
replaced an older long-standing mutual defensive alliance between Great Britain and
Japan with a new alliance between four powers that provided a limited form of mutual
protection. The Four-Power Accord was a major diplomatic coup by the United States, a
triumph further enhanced by a second treaty, the Five Power Limitation of Naval
Armament Treaty 74 , in which the five great powers of the world voluntarily agreed to
gradually reduce their current fleets’ sizes over a decade and maintain constant fleet
parity for that same decade. Linked to this naval reduction treaty was an additional five
power arms control treaty on the subjects of submarines and poison gas. These treaties
set out to create a system that balanced the great powers’ global influence and domination
and tried to ensure that for ten years no great power alone could challenge another’s
position by sea - in short, a system that hoped to ensure peace by making war impossible.
In essence, these treaties attempted through pragmatic diplomatic action to prevent
conflicts, of any sort, between the great powers by removing their capacity for easy or
successful aggression anywhere in the world.
The delegates at the Washington Naval Conference hoped that by placing
obstacles in the path of aggressive war, peace would be maintained and that their relative
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global positions of power would remain unchallenged. Stability was the central goal at
the Washington Naval Conference, and each power had its own reasons to desire
stability. Great Britain and France had global empires they needed to keep secure, and
Japan had achieved a position of Pacific dominance she wished to protect. The United
States and Italy lacked extensive territorial empires, but the United States sought to
ensure its foreign markets and Italy sought to ensure that its position as a great power and
its regional position of power in the Mediterranean would remain intact for the upcoming
decade. The work of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference was vital to ensuring the success
of this goal of a stable world order sought at the Washington Naval Conference. Without
a resolution of the issues dividing the great powers in China, any sort of disarmament
treaties promoting stability would have proven impossible to negotiate at the Washington
Naval Conference. Conversely, the success of the Far Eastern Affairs Conference hinged
upon the successful conclusion of the naval reduction treaty negotiated at the Washington
Naval Conference. The fruits therefore of both conferences were stability, armed peace,
and a voluntary reduction in possibilities, each signatory power yielding up some of its
ability to challenge its neighbor’s global interests. The Far Eastern Affairs Conference
achieved these goals regionally while the Washington Naval Conference achieved them
globally.
Of the various treaties successfully negotiated at the Washington Naval
Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference, those limiting naval armaments
negotiated at the Washington Naval Conference captured the greatest public accolades.
Treaties negotiated at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference to redress the balance of power
in China were welcomed by the public as progressive and useful, but the actual voluntary
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reduction of war readiness through arms reductions by the attending great powers was
popularly considered a great step towards world peace. One attending member of the
press at the Washington Naval Conference, H. G. Wells, captured the popular mood
when he wrote a series of essays about the conference that praised the ideals behind its
immediate purpose and that found the final success of the Naval Conference a sign of
greater things to come. Wells wrote broadly about how from the success of the
Washington Naval Conference other conferences would spring up, at which all the
remaining issues of tension between the world powers could be successfully resolved in a
spirit of compromise and reconciliation. 75 Ida Tarbell, another attending author at the
conference, reflected in her writing on the practical success of the attending great powers
in agreeing to a ten-year naval holiday. Beyond this pragmatic success of reducing naval
arms, though, Ms. Tarbell spoke of the strongly favorable public reaction to the spirit of
the negotiations. The public responded warmly to the perceived enthusiasm with which
the attending great powers agreed to reduce their overall naval arms levels. Ms. Tarbell
documented in her writing a generally held belief that with this first successful step
forward, the goal to bring about an end to war through broader reductions in weaponry
was now attainable. 76 This public hope that the success of the Washington Naval
Conference in reducing naval arms would usher in a new era of peace was not naïve;
some of the attending delegates felt the same way at the end of the conferences.
However, the public reaction and hopes did not take into account the pragmatic realities
that underlay the highly visible public success of the conference.
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The success of the Washington Naval Conference in reducing naval armament
levels rested upon a dual foundation: first, the simultaneous success of the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference in denying the ambitions of the new Chinese republic for
administrative control of all Chinese territory and the removal of unwanted foreign
influence within China, and second, the successful negotiation of the Four-Power Treaty.
Without this foundation, achieving an agreement to reduce naval arms would have been
highly unlikely because the Japanese delegation had to feel that their nation’s position
within China was in no danger of destabilization before Japan would even consider
reducing its naval arms. 77 This quid-pro-quo requirement by Japan was a major reason
for the considerable diplomatic success enjoyed by the Japanese delegation during the Far
Eastern Affairs Conference; the other delegates did not want the naval reduction treaty
negotiations derailed by other issues. Therefore, because of Japan’s diplomacy, the
labors of the two conferences were tightly interlinked. From the text of the naval
reduction treaties to the terms of the Four-Power Accord, the relative position of China
and Japan in Asia was the hinge point for both conferences. The other delegations were
willing to compromise so much at the Far Eastern Affairs Conference because the impact
of that conference was purely regional while the success of the naval conference would
have a global impact. The Nine-Power Treaty achieved a peace in China and the Pacific
through enforcement of the status quo, but the Naval Arms Reduction treaty ensured the
balance of power by reducing the very sinews of war.
The treaty that most directly links the efforts of the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference and the Washington Naval Conference was the Four-Power Accord. The
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Four-Power Accord was initially negotiated outside of both conferences by Great Britain,
the United States, and Japan to create a new alliance framework within the Pacific that
replaced the existing Anglo-Japanese defensive alliance. The final signatory power,
France, was made party to the treaty after its terms were already negotiated; the new
Four-Power Accord was announced formally on 19 December 1921. 78 The Four-Power
Accord was not a perfect document; it was broad in its terms and weak in specific
pledges of action, but it was a highly successful treaty in meeting the diplomatic demands
of its signatory nations. The United States wanted the Anglo-Japanese defensive alliance
terminated, the Japanese wanted a defensive alliance of some sort to protect their position
in the Pacific, and the British sought to tighten their diplomatic relationship with the
United States. The Four-Power Accord was a considerable diplomatic achievement
because it met these goals while also replacing a far more solid agreement of mutual
defense between Japan and Britain against any third, non-aligned power.
The Four-Power Accord’s history began with the signing of the original AngloJapanese defensive alliance on 30 January 1902. Great Britain sought out this alliance
initially to help protect her Asian colonial possessions, thus allowing Great Britain to
focus nautically upon containing the expanding German navy. Japan agreed to the
alliance to ensure protection for her territorial gains on the Asian mainland and to prevent
other powers from challenging her colonial expansion. Both parties benefited from the
treaty, and Japan was well protected diplomatically by this treaty; for example, when she
declared war upon Russia in 1904, Great Britain chose to remain neutral in that conflict
mainly out of respect for its treaty relationship with Japan. Fighting a diplomatically
isolated Russia, Japan triumphed in its war and rapidly expanded its position in China
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after its victory over Russia. Japan in 1904 seemed poised to join the ranks of the Great
Powers on a par with its European peers; however, the United States during its role as
mediator of the Russo-Japanese peace treaty was successful through a mix of diplomacy
and indirect intimidation in forcing Japan to lessen its gains from the Russo-Japanese
war. This intervention by the United States marked the beginning of a period of growing
mutual distrust between the United States and Japan.
The Anglo-Japanese defensive alliance in 1905 was revised primarily to recognize
Japan’s increased position within Korea and to amend the terms obligating each power to
aid the other militarily:
If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising,
on the part of any other Power or Powers either Contracting Party should be
involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests….the
other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally and will
conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it. 79
Great Britain in turn gained Japan’s agreement that their defensive alliance would be
expanded to include Great Britain’s possessions in India as well as in the Pacific. The
revised alliance was binding on both powers from 1905 until 1921. It was because of this
treaty that Japan entered World War I against Germany and, while fighting as Great
Britain’s ally, captured the German territories in China. Great Britain in 1919 stood
behind the promises made to Japan when it entered World War I in 1914 with the Triple
Entente powers, and the Versailles Treaty awarded to Japan the former German territories
in China. By 13 July 1921, when the Anglo-Japanese treaty was set to expire, the
Japanese government was committed to the alliance being renewed. In contrast, the
government of Great Britain, seeking stronger relations with the United States, wanted to
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graciously end this particular defensive alliance due to the concern it was raising within
the American government.
In essence, the key concern of American political leaders was what Great Britain
would do in the event of an American-Japanese clash in the Pacific, a clash that seemed
increasingly possible due to growing Japanese expansionism and militarism. Military
planners in the United States, remote as the risk seemed, were concerned that in some
possible war scenarios, Great Britain might join Japan in waging war upon the United
States. Policymakers within the United States government were aware that Japan had
become increasingly belligerent from 1905 onwards in asserting its Pacific diplomacy.
The growing belligerency was in part because the Japanese government used its alliance
with Great Britain as a counterweight to any other great power’s pressure in the Pacific.
Great Britain agreed in principle to an extension of the treaty in 1921 but did not sign a
formal renewal with Japan, instead delaying on the grounds that a new, broader treaty
might be negotiated during the Washington Naval Conference. Japan entered the
Washington Naval Conference seeking to have its position within Asia and the Pacific
ensured by a defensive alliance, while the United States sought to end the risk posed to its
position in the Pacific by the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and Great Britain sought a
graceful way out of the entire situation. 80 The Four-Power Accord was an impressive
diplomatic achievement because it provided protection for the status quo in Asia and an
assurance of stability through mutual defensive protection without actually pledging any
of the signatory powers to take concrete actions in the event of a conflict.
The Four-Power Accord was composed of four main articles and was ratified,
with two addendums, on 13 December 1921 at the Fourth Plenary session of the
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Washington Naval Conference. The major obligations and requirements of the treaty
were outlined in its first two articles. The first article stated:
The high contracting parties agree as between themselves to respect their
rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the
regions of the Pacific Ocean.
If there should develop between any of the high contracting parties a
controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said
rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect
the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them they shall
invite the high contracting parties to a joint conference to which the whole
subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.
The second article provided the quasi-defensive aspect of the agreement:
If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other
power the high contracting parties shall communicate with each other fully
and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient
measures to be taken, jointly and separately, to meet the exigencies of the
particular situation.
The final two articles dealt with administrative matters; the third article pledged the
signatories to honor this agreement for ten years and not to terminate the accord prior to
the conclusion of the full decade. The third article also established that the Four-Power
Accord would continue past the first decade unless one of the signatories, following an
involved notification procedure, ended the treaty. The fourth article pledged the
signatories to ratify the treaty as soon as possible by each nation’s respective
constitutional means and also stated that, upon ratification, the Four-Power Accord would
terminate the Anglo-Japanese agreement originally signed in 1902 and renewed in 1904
and again in 1911. 81 When the treaty was ratified by the Washington Naval Conference
delegates on 13 December 1921, two additional appendices were added. The first stated
that although the treaty applied to the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific, the
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United States did not, in signing the treaty, recognize the legitimacy of those mandates.
The second appendix pledged that the treaty did not apply to matters “which according to
principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the
respective powers.” 82 Both of these appendices were included out of sensitivity to
domestic political pressures within the United States that opposed some of the potential
ramifications of the Four-Power Accord as initially written.
The first article of this treaty is particularly noteworthy because it pledged each of
the four major great powers in the Pacific to mutually recognize each other’s spheres of
influence for a full decade. This pledge was critical because it provided the Japanese
government with a written assurance that Japan’s special position within China would be
respected as well; by placing Japan’s Pacific island holdings beyond war it severely
reduced the ability of other powers to use military force in China. This in turn was a
major means of ensuring stability within the region because by forcing each of the
signatory powers to publicly renounce any concerns or challenges they had with the
allocation of territory and resources in the Pacific, the risk of Japan resorting to war to
protect its Pacific interests was greatly reduced. The second article of the treaty also had
a profound impact on the possibility of stability in the Pacific because it gave the
impression, but not the substance, of a mutual defensive military alliance. The article
required that if any signatory nation’s rights in the Pacific were threatened by any other
power, the signatory nations would “communicate with each other frankly and fully” to
find an “efficient” means of resolving the issue. The treaty did not specify what
responses this might encompass, or even require any actual action be taken; it just
required that all the parties speak honestly and bluntly with each other about a solution.
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What makes this a brilliant piece of diplomatic language is that this article could be seen
as a pledge that every signatory power would first rapidly figure out a solution to a
regional crisis and then just as swiftly take action. As this action could, in theory, include
the possibility of military action by the other signatory powers to contain aggression
instigated by one signatory power against another, for the Japanese government the FourPower Accord was an acceptable replacement to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, not ideal
but acceptable. 83
For the United States, the Four-Power Accord was ideal because it left America
free of any direct military commitments to foreign wars. In 1921 it would have been
difficult for the political leadership of the United States to convince its citizens to agree
to any treaty that directly pledged American military action in a foreign war. The second
article, by only requiring the United States to communicate frankly with its partner
signatory nations in the event of aggression, a pledge of moral support, left the United
States government completely free to dictate its reaction to any crisis on a case-by-case
basis. The addendums to the Four-Power Accord were added first to respect the United
States’ position opposing any treaty that even potentially infringed on American national
sovereignty by restricting the scope of the Four-Power Accord to only non-domestic
issues; second, the other addendum to the Four-Power Accord, where the United States
refused to recognize the mandates formally but pledged to respect them, was part of the
legally delicate international situation caused by the United States not being a member of
the League of Nations. The mandates placed on the Pacific islands and awarded to Japan
were a direct creation of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations. The United
States, as a non-signatory to that treaty and a non-member of that assembly, maintained a
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position throughout the 1920s where it refused technically to recognize certain actions of
the League of Nations. Pragmatically, though, this addendum was a concession to Japan
because one of the sources of tension between the two nations was the American
government’s position of non-recognition of Japan’s mandates.
The Four-Power Accord overall was, on one level, a diplomatic loss for Japan.
Instead of successfully renewing the more militarily useful Anglo-Japanese alliance,
Japan gained a position in a broader, but less military, pan-Pacific partnership. To a
certain degree, Japan had to accept this new treaty because Britain resisted renewing the
older defensive alliance as part of a broader effort to gain goodwill with the United
States. However, the Four-Power Accord on another level was a gain for Japan because
the Accord formally acknowledged the status quo in the Pacific as it existed in 1921. As
the Japanese government at both conferences sought to protect its position in China and
the Pacific, the Four-Power Accord was valuable because it theoretically achieved this
goal in one of the two concerned spheres. The main success of the Four-Power Accord,
though, was that it paved the way towards the successful negotiation of the naval arms
reduction treaty. Without some sort of protective alliance, Japan would have been far
more resistant to the proposed levels of disarmament out of fear of war. 84
The treaty for the reduction of naval arms, formally titled the Five-Power
Limitation of Naval Armament Treaty, was the cornerstone goal and effort of the
Washington Naval Conference. The naval arms limitation treaty got its formal start on
12 November 1921 following the opening address for the conference that was given by
the President of the United States, Warren G. Harding. Harding spoke broadly in his
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speech, calling upon the conference delegates to join in a collective effort to promote
peace and move away from conflict and hate. Harding’s speech was filled with pleasant
generalities, in keeping with diplomatic traditions of the time. The speech immediately
following Harding’s, in contrast, was a diplomatic explosion as Charles Evan Hughes,
conference delegate and Secretary of State for the United States, outlined a detailed plan
for massive naval disarmament. After giving a brief history of previous disarmament
conferences, Hughes argued that these past efforts failed due to a lack of will by the
attending powers, a failure due to timidity. Hughes then outlined four broad, bold
principles he felt the upcoming conference should embrace in forming the naval
reduction treaty:
1. That all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or projected, should
be abandoned.
2. That further reduction should be made through the scrapping of certain
of the older ships.
3. That in general regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the
powers concerned.
4. That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of
strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combat craft
be prescribed. 85
Hughes moved directly from this statement of fairly concrete principles to state a series
of even more concrete pledges; he declared that the United States was ready to
immediately scrap a total of thirty capital ships with a total weight of 845,740 tons. This
included scrapping all the ships built since 1916, ships built as part of a massive effort by
United States to increase its fleet by ten new battleships and six battle cruisers. The cost
of scrapping just this post-1916 construction alone would be $330,000,000. Hughes then
called upon Great Britain to scrap a total of 583,375 tons and Japan a total of 448,928
tons of capital ships, smaller overall sacrifices that included both older existing ships and
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new ships under construction. Hughes concluded his initial presentation by outlining
specific timetables for the replacement of ships over the next decade; his timetables
called for an initial six-year naval holiday during which no new capital ships would be
built. 86
After outlining his proposed initial foundation for a comprehensive naval arms
reduction treaty, Hughes concluded his opening speech by reminding the delegates that
work still needed to be completed on several issues. Hughes drew the conference
delegates’ attention to a few key issues: the role of submarines in war, the use of aircraft
in war, auxiliary naval craft limits, and the capital ship fleet tonnage allowances for
France and Italy. Hughes’ initial proposals were meticulously detailed; he even named
the specific capital ships the United States recommended that Great Britain and Japan
scrap and listed the full complement of American ships that were to be destroyed. 87 The
immediate reactions of the other delegations were enthusiastic, and several pledged
support “in principle” to the American proposals outlined by Hughes; the other national
delegates formally expressed their initial concerns on 15 November 1921. Speaking for
the British delegation, the Right Honorable Arthur J. Balfour, Lord President of the
Council, expressed Great Britain’s enthusiasm for the plan as outlined but also stated that
Britain would have to proceed with caution, due to its globally dispersed imperial
holdings. Balfour stressed to the other delegates, in particular the delegates and audience
from the United States, that Britain’s strategic difficulties and traditional reliance upon
the sea as its means of survival required that it be sure any naval arms reduction treaty
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left Britain secure. 88 Speaking for the Japanese delegation, Admiral Baron Tomosaburo
Kato, Minister of the Marine, formally stated that although Japan agreed in principle with
Hughes’ proposal, it could not agree to the naval ratios as outlined. Japan would require
a slightly higher ratio than the navies of the United States and Great Britain to ensure its
security. 89
Hughes’ plan focused primarily upon the reduction of capital ships, specifically
dreadnaughts, battleships, and battle cruisers. Naval theory in the 1920s linked a nation’s
capacity to wage aggressive war with its ability to control sea access. World War I had
proven that only a nation or alliance with strong naval power could keep its lines of trade
open and block its rival’s commerce and that through these measures naval power could
shape a broader land war. Furthermore, because in 1922 many great powers saw the
Pacific region as a likely source of future conflict, the issue of naval power was even
more vital. Any potential war in the Pacific would have to rely quite heavily upon naval
forces due to the vast distances involved. Therefore, an unspoken goal of Hughes’
proposal was to create a system of regional parity by destroying enough capital ships that
aggressive war became far more difficult for any power, alone or in an alliance, to
conduct. A key aspect of Hughes’ proposal was to strike an equal balance of power
between Great Britain and the United States. By making their fleets effectively equal in
tonnage, Hughes hoped both nations would counterbalance each other as equal global
powers. If Hughes’ proposals worked and successfully neutralized the risk of aggressive
war, then the naval arms reduction treaty would also simultaneously solidify the political
and territorial status quo in the Pacific and around the world.
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Peace, stability, and naval fleets solely capable of defense were the ideals outlined
by the United States at the Washington Naval Conference; however, practical concerns
threatened these ideals from the outset. The cornerstone of the proposed system for
reducing naval armaments was the scrapping of capital ships, mainly battle cruisers and
battleships, and assigning to each signatory power a maximum limit upon capital ship
fleet size based upon a comparative tonnage ratio. Hughes’ initial proposal called for an
initial ratio of 6-5-3 in 1922 that, through replacements and future construction, by 1932
would change to of 5-5-3. In essence, this meant that for every five tons of capital ships
possessed by the United States and Great Britain in 1932, Japan would possess three tons
of capital ships. Initially the rationale for this was based upon both Britain’s and the
United States’ need to maintain fleets on multiple oceans, while Japan could concentrate
its naval defenses solely in the Pacific Ocean. In theory, Japan’s smaller fleet in overall
tonnage would regionally match either the United States or Great Britain in the event of
war. However, this initial proposed set of ratios, and the naval treaty itself, were put into
jeopardy almost immediately by the Japanese delegation’s demand that the initial fleet
and final fleet ratios be set at 10-10-7, respectively. This demand by the Japanese
delegation, setting its fleet at seventy percent of the size of the individual fleets of Great
Britain and the United States, was felt by the naval experts at the conference to be of
sufficient magnitude to allow Japan to wage aggressive war. Admiral Kato, leading the
Japanese delegation in this demand, initially challenged Hughes’ proposed ratios based
upon concerns for Japan’s ability to defend itself and then by challenging the pre-treaty
fleet sizes calculated by the naval experts. 90
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On 30 November 1921, the Japanese delegation announced it intended to remain
firm on its demand for a modified 10-10-7 capital ship ratio; the naval treaty reached an
official deadlock. However, private negotiations continued between Kato, Hughes, and
Balfour seeking a compromise where Japan would be willing to accede to the original 55-3 ratio. Eventually the beginning of a new compromise was reached; Kato promised
Japan’s consent to the lesser ratio if, in exchange, Great Britain and the United States
would agree to two new requirements. The first requirement was an agreement that no
new fortifications or naval base development would occur in the Pacific until 1932. The
second requirement was that the Japanese navy be allowed to maintain the Mutsu, a
newly constructed Japanese super dreadnaught that had considerable sentimental value
for the Japanese public. The high sentimental value of the Mutsu for the Japanese public
first stemmed from the fund-raising conducted by Japanese school children to help pay
for its completion and second because it was a powerful symbol of Japanese naval
development and national pride. Neither of these new requirements by Japan, though,
was agreed to initially even on principle as both Great Britain and the United States felt
that these concessions, without certain caveats, would make the naval strengths of the
three nations unbalanced. 91
The less complicated challenge that the three negotiating powers had to resolve
was the technically advanced nature of the Mutsu. To maintain a balance between the
three powers’ navies, the effective fighting strength of each navy had to be in proportion,
as well as the navies’ overall tonnage. Ships like the Mutsu were referred to officially as
“post-Jutland ships,” as the 1916 Jutland naval battle had been a major turning point in
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naval design theory. Prior to the Battle of Jutland, Great Britain had focused upon the
construction of battle cruisers, ships with heavy armament and high speed, advantages
gained at the sacrifice of armor. Battle cruisers also allowed Britain to rapidly expand its
capital ship fleet prior to World War I at reduced expense. After Jutland, naval planners
moved towards constructing slower heavier warships, referred to as “superdreadnaughts,” ships built with more powerful guns and very heavy armor to provide
longer protection in battle. In 1921 Great Britain’s naval strength still rested heavily
upon ships that had been built prior to World War I, ships that Jutland had shown were
vastly outmatched by the newer super-dreadnaughts in combat. The original naval
reduction proposal outlined by Hughes allowed Japan, Great Britain, and the United
States to retain one super-dreadnaught each, respectively the Nagato, the Maryland, and
the Hood. Japan’s insistence that it retain the Mutsu in addition to the Nagato gave its
navy a two-to-one superiority in super-dreadnaughts to the other two powers. However,
simply allowing the other two powers to also retain an extra super-dreadnaught each
would disrupt the 5-5-3 ratio. Because maintaining a strategic and tactical balance
between these three navies was seen as the key to avoiding future wars, a compromise to
this problem that was acceptable to all the concerned powers had to be achieved for the
treaty to succeed.
On 15 December 1921, the issue was successfully resolved with a modification to
the original proposal that re-configured the three nation’s navies to allow superdreadnaught parity to be achieved and simultaneously maintain the 5-5-3 ratio. Japan
would retain the Mutsu and the Nagato, the United States would in turn finish
constructing two new super-dreadnaughts of the West Virginia class, and Great Britain
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would be allowed to complete two of the four super-dreadnaughts of the Hood class it
had begun constructing in August 1921. The new plan, though, also required each
signatory nation to scrap additional older ships: Japan the Settsu, the United States the
North Dakota and the Delaware, and Great Britain four ships of the King George V type.
Great Britain’s additional ship destruction was delayed, though, until the completion of
the new Hood type super-dreadnaughts for British naval security to be maintained
without interruption. A minor irony of this agreement was that Britain ended up agreeing
to spend approximately $80,000,000 in 1921 dollars on new armaments in the interest of
achieving a balanced treaty of disarmament. 92 With this compromise, the key
requirement of parity in effective regional naval strength had been achieved; and with
regional parity the United States, Great Britain, and Japan had all effectively limited their
ability to wage aggressive war.
The other major compromise required by the Japanese delegation was that Britain
and the United States agree that within a defined area of the Pacific Ocean, all three
powers would build no new naval facilities or fortifications nor improve existing military
structures. This moratorium on building and expanding militarily useful structures would
remain in effect from the date of treaty ratification in 1922 until 1932. This compromise
was challenging to formulate because all three powers agreed that it would not include
their own domestic territories or the dominions of Australia and New Zealand. Firmly
defining these boundaries proved difficult. Underneath the surface negotiations, the issue
in contention was the ability of Great Britain and the United States to project naval power
into the Pacific region; in 1921 the United States lacked any Pacific naval bases with
adequate facilities to support large scale fleet operations. Great Britain had one major
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naval base in Singapore but no other Pacific bases capable of supporting a fleet of the
size necessary to challenge the Japanese navy. The United States navy had planned in
1921 to build new naval facilities on Guam and the Philippines, but as a concession to
Japan, the United States conference delegation agreed that the proposed construction
moratorium would include those two islands and also the Aleutian Islands. Great Britain
agreed to a zone of no construction north of Singapore, and the final agreement was
codified in Article XIV of the Naval Power Limitation Treaty. 93
The actual text of Article XIV itself reflects the complexity of the negotiations
necessary to formulate this compromise:
The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status
quo at the time of the signing of the present treaty with regard to
fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective
territories and possessions specified hereunder:
(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may
hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (1) those adjacent to the
coast of the United States, Alaska, and the Panama Canal Zone, not
including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;
(2) Hong Kong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now
holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian
of 110 degrees east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of
Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (c) New
Zealand.
(3) The following insular territories and possessions of the Japan in the
Pacific Ocean, to whit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, AmamiOshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any
insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may
hereafter acquire.
The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies
no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories
and possessions specified, that no measures shall be taken to increase the
existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and
that no increase shall be made in the coast defenses of the territories and
possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude
such repair and replacement of wornout weapons and equipment as is
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customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace. 94
The final paragraph of this article outlines the key tenet of the agreement: Great Britain,
Japan, and the United States agreed to contain their ability to wage war against each other
within the Pacific. By both the United States and Great Britain agreeing to the limitations
outlined above, any sort of major naval activity within the Pacific would be difficult. In
addition, it also made any joint military action between these two powers against Japan
difficult. This concession, though, extended beyond preserving the status quo within the
Pacific Ocean itself. It also amounted to an agreement between the three key nations that
Japan’s position within China would be protected from any challenge from the other
powers. This unwritten agreement was a requirement critical for the Japanese
government to feel safe taking a smaller fleet allotment in tonnage and number than that
allotted to Great Britain and the United States. The agreement not to improve military
facilities within the Pacific Ocean effectively “sealed” the region for ten years. Should
any of the three powers wish to modify their holdings or position within the Pacific
Ocean, they would have to do so through diplomacy or politics, not military action or
threat of action.
With an accord reached between the United States, Japan, and Great Britain about
capital ship ratios, pre- and post-Jutland ships, and fortifications in the Pacific, the three
signatory powers then presented their work to the remaining two great powers, France
and Italy. The delegations of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan had determined
that the fair ratio for France and Italy was 1.75 tons of capital ships each to the five tons
of Great Britain and the United States, a ratio that also gave the two powers naval parity.
That would have put the total capital ship tonnage ratios at 5-5-3-1.75-1.75, a proposed
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five power ratio that infuriated the French delegates. On 15 December 1921, the French
delegation formally demanded that France be granted a capital ship tonnage equal to that
of Japan, which meant a total French capital ship fleet of 350,000 tons. In addition the
French delegation, its demands spearheaded by Albert Sarraut, Senator of France and
French Minister of Colonies, 95 insisted that as France had suspended its naval
construction entirely due to the demands of World War I, it would have to build ten new
capital ships of 35,000 tons each. This was a horribly destabilizing pair of demands; not
only would it disrupt the agreed-upon capital ship ratios, but it would also give France ten
post-Jutland super dreadnaughts, a figure that dwarfed the allotment of modern super
dreadnaughts for any other power. The other delegations refused the French demands
and the conference deadlocked temporarily until the deadlock was cleared by a bit of
diplomatic intrigue. 96
Hughes on 16 December 1921, in an effort to end the capital ship tonnage
deadlock, broke diplomatic protocol and telegraphed Briand in Paris. Hughes directly
appealed to Briand, asking him as France’s Prime Minister to act in the interest of
achieving an agreeable balance and overturn the French delegation’s position. Briand, in
a personal telegraph back to Hughes, on 18 December 1921 changed France’s position
formally and agreed to the original proposed capital ship ratio for France and the
agreement to temporarily halt all new capital ship construction. However, Briand in the
same telegram insisted that France could not agree to any limitation on the tonnage of
auxiliary naval ships or submarines, ushering in a new controversy at the conference.
95

George Foster Pearce, Right Honorable Senator, Conference on the Limitation of Armament
held at Washington D.C., United States of America, from the 12thNovember 1921 to 6th February 1922:
report of the Australian delegate, Senator the Right Hon. George Foster Pearce (Melbourne: A.J. Mullett
for the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1922), 4.
96
Buell, The Washington Conference, 212-214; Levermore, League of Nations handbook, 310.

84

However, the key agreement needed on capital ship tonnage had been reached, France
had conceded to the demands of the conference and accepted parity with Italy and an
inferior position to the other great powers in capital ship tonnage. Originally, the French
delegation had argued that it needed a capital ship fleet on a par with that of Japan
because of France’s need to be able to simultaneously protect its global commerce and
maintain fleet parity with Italy in the Mediterranean. As the French position on its capital
ship needs had not changed, its acceptance of its reduced fleet status was, and was
perceived at the time to be, a diplomatic loss. The issue at the heart of the French
delegation’s stubborn insistence on naval parity with Japan, and later stance on
submarines and auxiliary craft tonnage, was based upon what the French military
perceived it needed to ensure the stability of France’s global position. 97
M. Briand’s reply to Hughes’ telegram holds within its text the essence of the
next major issues to divide the attending delegates - submarines and auxiliary naval craft:
But so far as defensive ships are concerned (light cruisers, torpedo
boats and submarines) it would be impossible for the French Government,
without putting itself to contradiction with the vote of Chambers, to accept
reductions corresponding to those which we accept for capital ships under
this formal reserve which you will certainly understand.
The idea which dominates the Washington Conference is to restrict naval
armaments which are offensive and costly. But I do not believe that it is
in the program to deny to a nation like France, which has a large extent of
coasts and a great number of distant colonies, the essential means of
defending its communications and its security. 98
Treaty-imposed limitations on auxiliary naval craft were limited by the Washington
Naval Conference to a series of weak restrictions; auxiliary and support craft built after
1922 were limited only in their total tonnage and gun size, respectively 10,000 tons
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standard displacement, and were unable to carry any gun with a caliber exceeding eight
inches. 99 These two limitations were to ensure that any auxiliary craft built after 1922
would be unable to successfully challenge a capital ship in direct gunnery combat.
However, Hughes’ original proposed plan had set out the idea of limiting each navy’s
total tonnages of auxiliary craft; this ideal had to be abandoned as the other four signatory
nations had little interest in restricting these smaller ships because auxiliary ships were
seen simply as cheap weapons of defense. This issue was also directly influenced by the
more caustic debate over the limitation or banning of submarines as ships of war; the
auxiliary craft category included those ships built to hunt submarines. In the face of a
stubborn demand by the French delegation over the right of France to maintain and use
unrestricted submarine fleets, the British delegation in turn fully supported allowing
unlimited auxiliary craft construction.
The open allowance for auxiliary craft tonnage was not seen by the attending
delegates as a failure of the Washington Naval Conference in one of its main objectives,
limiting naval arms, but rather as an unfortunate necessity required by the conference’s
success in reducing capital ship tonnage. The auxiliary craft allowed under the treaty
were not considered a tool for offensive wars that might challenge the status quo. Instead
they were seen solely as a means for the great powers to maintain their current spheres of
influence. British naval experts saw cruisers and destroyers, the most common type of
auxiliary craft, as vital to protecting British commercial interests against the threat of
submarine warfare. For the French, this open allowance would allow them to build the
ships they felt were necessary to protect their global imperial holdings and also allow
them defensive parity with Italy in the Mediterranean. Pragmatically, this compromise
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was necessary because it allowed the signatory great powers a means of adjusting their
naval strength relative to each other and to face any future changes in the global balance
of power, without risking offensive war or starting expensive naval arms races.
At the same time as the limitations on auxiliary ships were agreed upon, the
assorted signatory powers also agreed to a set of special, looser rules for future aircraft
carrier construction. Aircraft carriers were restricted mainly in total tonnage and the
maximum number each fleet could have, under the same body of regulations that covered
the signatory powers’ capital ship fleets. Aircraft carriers also were restricted in that they
could only be built and replaced after 1922 on the same schedule as capital ships;
however, beyond that the regulations were greatly relaxed. The signatory powers could
replace any or all of their current aircraft carriers that were built or in production by 12
November 1921 because such craft were deemed experimental by the delegates. Aircraft
carriers were limited individually to 27,000 tons each, but a signatory power could build
up to two new aircraft carriers with a limit of 33,000 tons each, assuming such
construction did not exceed their maximum total allowed capital ship tonnage. This
provision was in place to allow the signatory powers the option of converting up to two
of their current dreadnaughts under construction and scheduled for scrapping into aircraft
carriers instead. Finally, aircraft carriers were restricted in only the number and the
caliber of guns they could carry; all other details of construction or design were at the
discretion of the signatory powers. 100
Aircraft carriers existed to transport aircraft, one of the modern developments of
warfare whose impact would later vastly modify the balance of power in naval strength
between nations. At the same time that the naval arms reduction treaties were being
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negotiated, a proposal was considered by the Washington Naval Conference to limit the
use of aircraft in general as weapons of war, a proposal that was flatly rejected by the
reviewing committee. Although the Italian delegation later presented an idea to the
conference as a whole, bypassing the aircraft subcommittee, to limit the number of pilots
allowed in a nation’s armed forces, the conference agreed on 9 January 1922 with its
aircraft subcommittee’s findings that rules of warfare for the use of aircraft would be a
potential matter for a future conference. 101 Aircraft were a new weapon of war that had
come out of World War I. They were left unregulated as their total potential and threat
had yet to be understood; submarines, however, were a better understood and far more
controversial threat.
Of all the issues discussed at the Washington Naval Conference, the role of the
submarine in future warfare was probably the most acrimonious. The essence of the
controversy was that the British delegation sought from the conference a total ban on
submarine construction, use, and presence in any of the signatory nation’s fleets, while
the French delegation pressed hard for the entire issue of submarine regulation to be
dropped by the conference. The American delegation initially offered a compromise
solution that sought to limit the total tonnage of submarines held by each signatory
nation, an extension of their capital ship ratio plan, but this idea was unsatisfactory to
both the British and French delegates. The issue of submarines at the conference actually
masked a complicated diplomatic struggle between France and Great Britain over
regional dominance, the security of naval assets, and the security of commerce from
wartime raiding. The British delegation, led by Lord Lee of Fareham, G.B.E., K.C.B.,
and First Lord of the Admiralty, contended that submarines had no practical value as
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weapons of war, in that submarines could not adequately defend a nation’s coastlines
from naval assault and during World War I had proven ineffective at attacking vessels of
war. Instead, the British delegation argued, the submarine was most useful as a
commerce raider and in engaging specifically in surprise raids on unsuspecting
commercial shipping. 102
While this issue was being debated by a dedicated subcommittee on 30 December
1921, Lord Lee, to bolster Britain’s position, read excerpts from a French article that
seemed to justify British concerns. The article, on submarine warfare theory, was written
in January 1920 by Capitaine de Freygate Castex, a high ranked naval officer in the
French Mediterranean Fleet and an instructor in the French naval academy. The article
appeared in La Revue Maritime, a journal with an emphasis on historical matters in naval
warfare and a semi-official organ of the French navy. In his article Captain Castex
argued, according to Lord Lee, that the unrestricted use of the submarine by the Germans
in World War I had been a tactically sound strategy and had produced valuable results.
Furthermore, Lord Lee stated, Captain Castex also contended in his article that the tactic
of launching torpedo attacks upon merchantmen without first giving warning was not
unsound or even deplorable when considered against other tactics of modern war. Lord
Lee closed by reading to the subcommittee a powerful quote of Captain Castex directly
from his article:
After many centuries of effort, thanks to the ingenuity of man, the
instrument, the system, the martingale is at hand which will overthrow
for good and all the naval power of England. 103
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The controversy sparked by Lord Lee’s presentation required many weeks of further
negotiations to resolve. The French government initially denied the intent of the author
and then denied that the article represented French naval strategy. As the French denied
the article’s impact, the British delegation contended that this article revealed the true
feelings of the French government regarding the British navy and amounted to a French
plan to use submarines to cripple Britain if necessary. 104
The French delegation during those weeks of controversy, led on this issue by
Albert Sarraut and his French naval experts, argued that submarine fleets were a vital
option for naval defense for weaker nations and a useful means of guarding long
communication lines for an imperial power. Hughes attempted two compromises based
on tonnage limitations. First, he created a plan of submarine fleet tonnage limits based
on the same ratios as the capital ship ratios. This proposal was blocked by the British
delegation as it would have allowed most of the attending powers to increase the overall
size of their submarine fleets rather than destroy submarines. 105 Second, he restricted
submarine tonnage proposal, presented following Britain’s rejection of the first proposal,
which limited the United States and Great Britain in total submarine tonnage and
restricted the other signatory powers to only their currently constructed submarine fleet
sizes. This proposal failed to gain support. Italy objected because it was not given parity
with France in submarines, and Japan objected on the grounds that it gave the Japanese
navy a ratio of submarines in comparison to Great Britain and the United States that was
inferior to its granted capital ship ratio. 106
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However, the various delegations finally were able to create an agreeable
compromise that was also unique diplomatically, a treaty that regulated the use of a
weapon in warfare. Rather than attempting to restrict submarines through technical or
numeric limitations, the conference delegates instead created a set of laws of conduct that
would govern submarine attacks on commerce. The agreed rules of war specified that a
submarine could attack or seize a merchant ship only if the submarine first warned the
ship to halt and second searched the vessel to determine if it was a legitimate target; only
then could it sink the merchant ship and only if the crew and passengers were taken to
safety first. Militarily, such a set of rules made commerce warfare practically impossible,
a fact recognized formally by the conference:
The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of using
submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were
violated in the recent war of 1914- 1918, the requirements, universally
accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals
and non-combatants, and to the end that the prohibition of the use of
submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally accepted as part
of the law of nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth
binding as between themselves and they invite all other nations to adhere
thereto. 107
The signatory nations also agreed that any individuals who violated these rules of
conduct, whether or not they were acting in the service of a nation or under orders, were
to be tried for piracy. The specific wording of the treaty article did not specify
submarines but instead applied the rules to all vessels of war; however, the target of these
accords were submarines and their use in commerce raiding. These regulations on
commerce raiding, defining legal conduct of war, were critical because they introduced a
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new diplomatic approach for regulating or reducing certain aspects of war, rules of
conduct on combat. 108
These new rules on submarine warfare would ideally limit the impact of
submarines on future conflicts by eliminating their use as commerce raiders, considered
by many naval experts at the time to be their most valuable use in war. These regulations
met the needs of the British delegation and, as a result, the British dropped their demand
that submarines be banned outright. As the regulations also allowed France and any
other nation that wished to maintain submarine fleets the freedom to do so, the
compromise was acceptable to all. But beyond these immediate geopolitical concerns,
the lasting value of this agreement was the concept it enshrined: that individuals could be
held personally responsible for war crimes even if they acted under the orders of their
government. This concept, which would be used initially in the Nuremburg trials at the
end of World War II, was first outlined in this treaty. Finally these regulations on
submarine warfare were written both to protect commercial shipping and to meet the
moral expectations of the signatory nations that civilian life would be protected in war.
This agreement at the Washington Naval Conference represents one of the rare moments
when morality and diplomacy successfully meshed together. Because of this treaty
throughout the 1920s, policymakers’ concerns about the submarine as a force that could
undermine the global balance of power were alleviated, contributing to a decade of
relative peace.
The final major noteworthy accomplishment of the Washington Naval Conference
was the agreement banning the use of chemical agents in war. Agreed upon on 6 January
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1922, after a report by the weapons experts subcommittee, the attending delegates stated
simply:
The contracting parties agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the
sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. 109
The attending delegates formally acknowledged that the Versailles Treaty prohibited the
nation of Germany from using gas weapons, but the delegates felt a more universal ban
on chemical weapons was necessary. Banning poison gas in warfare was in part another
means of helping to ensure that the global balance of power would be maintained. The
attending delegates understood that cheap weapons that caused heavy casualties on large
areas of a battlefield could have modified France’s position of land dominance on the
European continent, which, in turn, might have provoked increased French militarism.
More broadly, though, this type of warfare was considered amoral and was prohibited on
humanitarian grounds, one of the few almost purely humanitarian decisions reached by
the Washington Naval Conference’s attending delegates. 110
Besides the Four-Power Accord, which was signed outside of the conference
proceedings, the Five-Power Limitation of Naval Armament Treaty with all the
provisions described above, filled with technical language and strict timetables, was
signed on 1 February 1922. The treaty on submarine warfare and poison gas was sent to
the attending nations for ratification in late January 1922 and was ratified after the
conference concluded. 111 But on 1 February 1922, the single greatest work of the
Washington Naval Conference was concluded, a treaty that would restrict and regulate
naval armaments for the next ten years, a treaty that enshrined stability and the status
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quo. The delegates who assembled in the city of Washington to negotiate this treaty,
after considerable work and diplomatic effort, created a document that at its heart sought
to avoid conflict by making aggressive war impossible. The delegates created a treaty
that allocated to the world respective spheres of influence and commerce, a treaty in
which the five greatest nations of the 1920s mutually agreed to limit their ability to fight
with each other at sea. In doing so the Naval Arms Limitation Treaty did more than
prevent war; it did more than restrict the signatory nations’ ability to use violence upon
each other. It forged a period of global stability.
World War I had ended in 1919 with the signing of the Versailles Treaty, but the
global peace of the 1920s was agreed upon in 1922 in the city of Washington, when the
five greatest nations of the world agreed to limit themselves to a period of defensive
focus rather than offensive spirit. Expansionism occurred in the 1920s, war broke out in
the 1920s, but the five great powers of the world from 1922 until the end of the treaty in
1932 did not jostle each other, did not assault each other, and respected their relative
zones of strength. In 1922, with the signing of these treaties, a new order in the world
was created, an order that maintained peace and stability for a decade. In the next,
concluding chapter, the overall impact that these treaties had, both for China and the
world, will be reviewed in a study of what this decade of peace meant and how it shaped
the 1930s and the lead-in to another global war.
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AFTER THE CONFERENCES: THE DECLINE TO WAR
By the end of January 1922, both the Washington Naval Conference and the Far
Eastern Affairs Conference drew to a close having, in combination, created a treaty
system for peaceful international relations that would be valid for at least the next decade,
if all the nations abided by their agreements. The Washington Naval Conference had first
produced treaties that restricted the use of certain weapons in warfare, and second
produced the Five-Power Naval Treaty, which reduced the total tonnage of capital ships
in existence and placed restrictions on the armament, size, and armor of future capital
ships. The Far Eastern Affairs Conference produced a set of treaties and resolutions that
mainly attempted to stabilize the Great Power situation within China; the most critical of
these was the Nine-Power Treaty, which attempted to provide for an overall
administrative and privileges framework in which China would gain some limited
autonomy and cease to be a source of international friction. Finally, negotiations outside
of the conferences proper, but critical to their success, created the Four-Power Accord,
which designed a new type of mutual defensive system within the Pacific region between
Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and France. This new defensive treaty was based
upon collective consultation and an agreement to preserve the status quo in the Pacific at
the time of the agreement. The overall goal of all these concurrent diplomatic efforts was
to attempt to create a unified framework to promote peace, stability, and order within the
world at large and specifically within the Pacific, and until the early 1930s, these efforts
largely succeeded.
The goal of total disarmament, though, was not achieved at the Washington Naval
Conference itself. Pacifists and those favoring disarmament felt more work was needed
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to create a system that would allow global harmony to exist through reduced arms. The
Five Powers Naval accord, which restricted naval armament levels, was written to expire
within a decade. The original plan formulated at the Washington Naval Conference was
that a series of subsequent diplomatic conferences would be held to further extend the
work of the Washington Naval Conference treaties. Ideally, from 1922 to 1932, it was
hoped that a series of additional diplomatic efforts would both further reduce armaments
levels on the seas and begin the work of reducing armaments on the land as well, and
through greater disarmament further reinforce the decisions made at the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference and allow China to remain a bastion of stability. 112 Although further
efforts were made from 1922 to 1932 to expand the disarmament system of the
Washington Naval Conference, these efforts failed due to a greatly changed diplomatic
scene within Europe. Concurrently in 1931, the situation in the Pacific rapidly
destabilized as well, due to Japanese expansionism, which, in turn, made the work of the
Far Eastern Affairs Conference irrelevant, further diminishing the odds of success for any
new disarmament initiatives. However, the basic reason that both treaty systems failed to
remain relevant after only one decade was not any failure of their design or
implementation but the series of major political events that occurred from 1929 – 1932,
which greatly modified the global diplomatic scene, making these treaties swiftly
inapplicable. But from 1922 – 1929, new efforts to extend disarmament and avoid
aggressive war failed mainly due to the same challenges that had nearly caused the
original Washington Naval Conference to fail several times in 1922.
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Great Britain, the United States, France, and Italy all grasped the nettle of general
disarmament; from 1926 to 1932 all four spearheaded planning a great disarmament
conference that was supposed to create a unified treaty system for universal land and sea
disarmament. Initially this conference was to take place in 1927; the League of Nations
established a Preparatory Commission in May 1926 to create the draft treaty for universal
disarmament to be considered by all the conference participants. A total of nineteen
nations sent delegates to serve on this Preparatory Commission, delegates who
represented all ten members of the League of Nations council, six key European nations,
and three critical non-member nations; both the United States and the Soviet Union
participated in this last category. To summarize the work of this Preparatory
Commission is unfortunately simple; it continually delayed the start of the general
disarmament conference for six years because the attending delegates could agree on very
few basic points upon which to begin work on a draft treaty. On naval issues alone, the
Great Powers were sharply divided due to the same concerns that were barely
circumvented at the Washington Naval Conference in 1922. For example, France and
Great Britain still would not accept universal limitations on cruiser construction. The
United States did not wish to establish two classes of cruiser as suggested by Great
Britain and France, one light and one heavy, that would be regulated differently because
doing so would require the United States to modify its naval construction plans to
compete in a new cruiser naval arms race. Italy, in turn, still refused any new ratios or
limitations of any sort that did not give it naval parity with France, and France
concurrently still refused any new treaty limitations that forced it into naval parity with
Italy. 113 These tensions within the Preparatory Commission reflected a broader increase
113
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in tension within Europe due to a major change in Europe’s diplomatic universe, the
return of Germany to the diplomatic fold of Europe as a “reformed” power.
By 1926 Germany had both signed the Locarno Agreements, through which it
agreed permanently to seek no future territorial adjustments on its western borders, and
joined the League of Nations as a full member. In doing so Germany became a
“reformed” power, which raised an uncomfortable diplomatic issue for France since the
requirement in the Versailles Treaties that Germany vastly disarm also required that the
other signatory nations eventually disarm to a similar level. After joining the League and
signing the Locarno Agreements, Germany began to insist on arms parity between all the
Great Powers, in line with the requirements of the Versailles Treaty. From 1926
onwards, it proved impossible to find a diplomatic balance between German demands for
armaments parity with the other Great Powers, either through German rearmament or
universal disarmament, and France’s insistence it needed more armaments than Germany
to remain secure. French demands that its land forces be maintained at a level higher than
Germany’s to ensure France’s security, despite even the Locarno Agreements, made
compromise on the issue of land armaments nearly impossible. As a naval power,
Germany had been reduced in 1919 to such a low level of armament that no other Great
Power in 1926 remotely considered lowering its naval strength to match Germany’s. 114
Fortunately for the other powers, Germany did not pursue equality in naval matters; it
focused its diplomatic efforts solely upon achieving parity in land armaments. However,
the spirit of concern caused by the German demands for equality on land further
complicated the work of the Preparatory Commission and caused the Great Power
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tensions that derailed the private naval disarmament talks taking place in the late 1920s to
expand the Washington Naval Conference system.
The first effort to update and expand the naval disarmament system created at the
Washington Naval Conference occurred from June to August 1927 with a series of naval
conversations between the original Washington Naval Conference signatories. This 1927
naval conference, which was sponsored by the United States and ran concurrently with
the work of the Preparatory Committee, initially succeeded in creating a tentative
agreement to limit submarines, destroyers, and some other classes of auxiliary ships.
This naval conference, though, collapsed over the issue of cruisers. Great Britain and the
United States were not able to agree over limitations based on either number or type of
cruisers. Great Britain wanted to expand its cruiser fleet under the proposed treaty, while
the United States sought no significant increases in cruiser fleet size. Japan attempted to
mediate this conflict between the two but proved unsuccessful; the cruiser issue also
forestalled the 1927 conference having to address Japan’s stated desire to increase its
own permitted capital ship allowance under the Washington Naval Conference system.
In 1928 an attempt was made to mediate the cruiser conflict. An agreement was
negotiated between Great Britain and France that separated cruisers into two classes,
based on gun caliber alone. This treaty limited so-called “heavy cruisers,” which
mounted guns greater than 6” in caliber, and allowed unlimited construction of “light
cruisers,” those carrying 6” or smaller guns. The United States was invited to join this
accord but rejected it for the same reason it had refused to compromise in 1927: the
separation of cruisers into two classes still permitted some form of unlimited cruiser
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construction, creating a new naval race the United States opposed. 115 The final major
effort at a multi-power naval compromise occurred in April 1930 when the five original
Washington Naval Conference signatories agreed to a treaty that extended the
Washington Naval Conference limitations treaty on capital ships for another three years;
limited cruiser strength to a similar ratio as capital ships, with the exception of Japan,
which was allowed to increase its cruiser fleet strength to 69% of British and American
cruiser strengths; and removed all restrictions on submarines. This treaty, though, and
naval disarmament with it, was a dead letter by 1932 as Germany and Japan simply began
to ignore the specified limitations on naval construction, both in capital ships and
cruisers, a policy followed by Great Britain, France, and the United States in turn as the
1930s progressed. 116
The diplomatic difficulties faced by the Preparatory Committee beginning in
1926, plus the failed naval disarmament conferences of 1927 and 1928, were
symptomatic of a slow shift by the Great Powers away from disarmament as a concept.
This slow shift in the 1920s, grounded in both nationalist motivations and low-intensity
Great Power rivalry, became much more rapid amidst the diplomatic tumult that erupted
in the early 1930s due to the economic collapse of the Great Depression. This
unprecedented economic disaster, which occurred concurrently with increased Japanese
aggression in China, undermined the entire set of assumptions upon which the
Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference had been based.
Up to the Great Depression, the issues delaying further naval and land disarmament were
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merely extensions of the original challenges faced in 1922 at the Washington Naval
Conference. But because of the Great Depression, the early 1930s saw major changes in
the balance of power between the Great Powers, which, in turn, drastically and radically
changed the global diplomatic landscape. Because of both of these factors, the treaty
systems created in 1922 did not precisely fail; more accurately, events made them utterly
irrelevant. The impact of the Great Depression on the diplomatic global order was one of
the two key reasons the work of the Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference collapsed entirely in the 1930s. As some of the stronger Great
Powers of 1922 reeled and weakened in the early 1930s, other powers saw an opportunity
to gain through rearmament and aggression.
One of the key impacts the Great Depression had on the diplomatic relations
between the Great Powers was its impact on international trade between them. As
national economies contracted, each Great Power had to seek new trade arrangements to
maintain steady sources of imported raw materials and export markets for its goods. The
Great Powers met this challenge mainly by moving away from an international openmarket perspective on trade and instead focused upon building regional or currencybased trade blocs to meet their needs. Through a system of reciprocal trade agreements,
priority trade agreements, and favored nations agreements, four major trading blocs
emerged: a dollar bloc dominated by the United States and encompassing much of the
western hemisphere, a pound bloc dominated by Great Britain and composed of its
dominions, a yen bloc based around Japan and the Asian mainland, and a gold-standard
bloc made up of France and several minor European nations. Even with these trade
blocs, international trade and economic productivity for each Great Power remained
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diminished in the early 1930s, and with economic decline came falling national tax
revenues. Because of that, each Great Power faced a challenging choice: to reduce its
government expenditures for armaments to economize and thereby lower the tax burden
on their economies or invest heavily in armaments and boost their economy in the shortterm at the risk of future, more severe, economic problems. 117
Japan by the early 1930s was forced into the armaments approach. Unable to
meet its basic needs for imported goods through its trading bloc, it still had to rely upon
imports provided by other Great Powers, in particular imports of petroleum and scrap
steel from the United States. Japan in the early 1930s was also facing internal challenges
due to a rapidly increasing domestic population, which, when coupled with systemic
inefficiencies in its financial systems, corruption within its government, and agricultural
production challenges, created severe internal political instability. Japanese civilian
government in this same period was undermined by domestic unrest caused by Japan’s
military junior officer corps. By 1932, the civilian government of Japan was no longer in
effective control of Japan’s armed forces. Due to this, the Japanese military was able to
gain significant budgetary increases and follow a semi-independent agenda of massive
armament increases, military aggression, and colonial inspired conquest. It was because
the Japanese armed forces had become semi-autonomous, and the Japanese civilian
government weak, that Japan undertook the first major act of aggression of the 1930s, an
act that signaled the end of the treaty system established by the Far Eastern Affairs
Conference in 1922. 118
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The specific act of aggression was the infamous Mukden incident, which began
on 18 September 1931 at 10:20am with a staged attack upon the Southern Manchurian
railroad. This event, and the subsequent coordinated invasion and conquest of
Manchuria, was orchestrated by junior officers of the Japanese Kwantung army. The
Kwantung army had been stationed in Manchuria since the 1920s to protect both
Japanese citizens living in Manchuria and the Southern Manchurian railroad. The
Kwantung army, of all the Japanese military forces in the early 1930s, was the most
resistant to control by the civilian government of Japan and carried out its campaign in
Manchuria in direct defiance of orders to halt issued by Japan’s political leadership. In a
swift campaign the Kwantung army occupied all of Manchuria, organized a new
“independent” nation within its recently gained territory, named its new creation
Manchukuo, and placed Henry Pu Yi, the last Manchu Emperor of China, in place as its
puppet ruler. The Japanese government, after both a furious bout of direct orders
demanding that the Kwantung army cease its actions and several failed efforts to control
this rogue army through the Japanese military’s higher command, eventually recognized
the political actions of the Kwantung army rather than admit it had lost effective control
of Japan’s armed forces. Japan went before the other Great Powers and announced that
the recent actions of the Kwantung army were actually in support of local agitation by the
Manchurian population to gain their independence from China.119 This incident was the
immediate event that began the unraveling of the treaties created at the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference in 1922; it began the rapid collapse of the League of Nations and the
ideal of “collective security” as well.
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The response of the other Great Powers to Japan’s conquest of Manchuria was not
particularly strong. The matter was presented to the League of Nations, which sent an
investigative committee to review the situation and determine if Manchukuo was an
actual creation of the Chinese residents of Manchuria. The final official report of this
inquiry, called the Lytton Report after the man who led the investigation, was diplomatic
in language but bluntly stated that the Kwantung army had created Manchukuo as a
puppet state and that the Chinese residents of Manchuria had not revolted to form
Manchukuo; they placed ultimate responsibility for these events upon the Japanese
government. In response, Japan formally resigned from the League of Nations on 24
February 1933, having rejected a League of Nations proposal to create “an independent
Manchuria under Chinese sovereignty.” By resigning from the League of Nations, Japan
was defying the expressed will of its collective membership and more critically the will
of the two strongest Great Powers perceived in the League in 1932, Great Britain and
France. Japan defied these two formidable nations, ignored the moral condemnation of
the United States, and nothing further happened. 120 No other nation’s armed forces
intervened in Manchuria to force Japan to vacate the territory, no effort was made to cut
Japan’s foreign trade, the other Great Powers publicly decried Japan’s action but
effectively accepted it as a fait accompli. The Great Powers’ acceptance of the events in
Manchuria had a variety of reasons: national paralysis due to the economic situation, low
public enthusiasm for a new potential war in Great Britain and France, and lack of
military strength to actually take action against Japan in 1932.
Prior to the Kwantung army’s conquest of Manchuria, most of the signatory
nations to the treaties formulated at the Washington Naval Conference had actually
120
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avoided replacing outmoded ships as was permitted to them under the agreed-upon
treaties. Right after the Five Power Naval Accord was ratified by all the signatories, the
government of the United States sharply reduced the American navy’s budget, its
manpower and tonnage afloat, to the absolute minimums the American navy considered
safe for national defense. In 1922 right after the treaty was signed, the American navy
had to undertake an extensive dedicated lobbying effort to avoid having the United States
Congress reduce it to a mere token force. Although the American navy successfully
avoided this fate, the initiative itself reflected an attitude by America’s political
leadership that ensured the United States laid no new major keels from 1922 until the
mid-1930s. The United States’ government reduced the number of ships in the American
fleet per the terms of the treaty but failed between 1922 and 1932 to build any of the
replacement ships allowed to the United States under the Five-Power Naval Treaty. 121
The United States was not alone in its choice not to build replacement ships. By
1931 Great Britain, France, and Italy had all failed to complete their allowed naval
construction under the Five-Power Naval Treaty of 1922 and the subsequent naval
agreement of 1930, an agreement that actually increased the overall replacement
allowances of 1922. In contrast, by 1931 Japan reported that it had fallen slightly behind
its 1930 treaty approved replacement schedule, but officially informed the other
signatories to the 1930 accord that although Japan would not necessarily complete its full
replacement allotment by 1936, it intended to maintain construction towards those limits
no matter what future treaties were signed regarding naval reductions or disarmament. 122
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Japan was not alone in its determination to expand its navy to the allowed 1930 treaty
limits. Under Mussolini, Italy after 1931 began an ambitious naval construction program
of its own to publicly increase the Italian fleet to the limits allowed under the new naval
accord of 1930. In fact Italy built beyond those limits as the 1930s progressed and
simply underreported its ship tonnages. 123 This growing naval imbalance between the
Great Powers, due to the decline in overall fleet strength of Great Britain, France, and the
United States from 1922 to 1932 while in contrast the naval strength of Japan, and, to a
lesser degree, Italy, grew in the same period, undermined the very stability that was the
original goal behind the Five-Power Naval Treaty. The balance of power created
globally in 1922 at the Washington Naval Conference collapsed because three of its
principle signatory nations did not allocate enough national resources to create the naval
strength necessary to keep that balance in existence. This growing discrepancy was only
further reinforced by the complete failure of the World Disarmament Conference when it
finally met in 1932.
The final international effort of the 1930s to achieve general disarmament began
on 2 February 1932 with the opening in Geneva of the World Disarmament Conference.
Sixty-four nations were invited to attend, and of those, fifty-nine sent delegations; all five
of the 1922 Great Powers were represented at the conference. The conference opened
with considerable popular support; various politically active groups around the world,
including the British League of Nations Union, France’s assorted socialist parties and
pacifist groups, and American pacifist organizations, all pressured the major democracies
to use this conference as a means of preventing further war. The success attributed by
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these groups to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 “outlawing” war as a means of national
policy, and the earlier Locarno Treaty signed between Germany and France, fueled a
popular idealism that this world disarmament conference would succeed in ending
aggressive war. Many people felt that if an extension of the compromises that had
seemed to work so well in 1922 at the Washington Naval Conference could be brought to
these proceedings, and if the attending governments could meet together again in the
same spirit as 1922, a new treaty system to prevent conflict through mutual disarmament
could be achieved. Unfortunately for this optimism, the world by 1932 was quite
different from what it had been even in 1928, and the Great Powers attending the
conference in Geneva were unable to even begin to agree on a basic framework for any
sort of general or specific disarmament negotiations to proceed. 124
The World Disarmament Conference officially met from early February 1932
until late January 1933. During its twelve months meeting, its work was shaped by many
external events and internal diplomatic maneuvers, but the key external event that
derailed the conference’s work took place in Germany when the Nazi party, on 31 July
1932, rose to their highest pre-dictatorship political prominence. Prior to that date, the
tone of the conference had been set by the moderate German delegation that had
demanded, as it had in the late 1920s, that the other attending nations either disarm to
military parity with Germany or Germany be allowed to rearm to military parity with its
neighbors. This German demand was completely unacceptable to the French delegation,
which demanded that at the end of this conference France’s domestic security be
completely ensured against “foreign aggression.” The disparity in strength between the
economic and military potential of Germany and France guaranteed that the attending
124
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French delegation, and the French government, could not agree to military equality
between France and Germany. Another problem inhibiting the conference’s progress was
the rivalry between Italy and France over naval limits, worsened now that Mussolini as
Italy’s dictator had embarked upon a major program of Italian naval expansion that he,
and therefore Italy’s attending delegation, was unwilling to halt or diminish. 125
In the first six months of the disarmament conference, attempts to meet
Germany’s demands by disarming were dominated by proposals to remove “offensive”
weaponry from national arsenals. Many nations’ delegations presented different
proposals to attempt to define and plan this ambitious objective. Each effort failed
because none of the attending delegates could agree what constituted “offensive”
weaponry. After the political triumph of the Nazi party in July 1932, the German
delegation, under considerable domestic political pressure from the triumphant Nazis,
became very rigid and would accept only those proposals that allowed Germany to
achieve armament parity with the other Great Powers; the German delegation argued this
was the only proper and fair course of action. By December 1932 the conference had
deadlocked over German rearmament and no effective disarmament negotiations were
occurring, with Hitler’s appointment to the Chancellorship in Germany on 30 January
1933 the conference finally collapsed. Although by December 1932 the conference was
no longer remotely effective, one of Hitler’s first actions when in power was to withdraw
Germany’s delegation. Without German participation, the entire conference effort
became pointless and the conference delegations dispersed. 126
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The 1932 World Disarmament Conference marked the end of international efforts
at disarmament, and the speedy process of arming for future wars began anew, a
development that effectively ended the Washington Naval Conference system. Beyond
causing the failure of the World Disarmament Conference, though, the events of 1932
signaled the end of international disarmament as a diplomatic goal because the political
situation that had existed in 1922 was no longer present in Europe or Asia. In 1922
Germany had been recently defeated in the first global war, disarmed by treaty, and
became a diplomatic pariah. Italy had not yet fallen to Mussolini’s much vaunted march
on Rome, and fascism was a political movement but not yet a system of government.
Japan was headed by a civilian government that was in control of its own armed forces
and was more interested on co-existence than belligerence. But even in 1922, rivalries at
the Washington Naval Conference nearly halted the successful negotiation of the naval
disarmament treaties, and the subsequent events that blocked disarmament efforts in the
later 1920s were rooted in those same national rivalries of 1922. So although the great
economic collapse of 1929 to 1932, the successful Japanese take over in Manchuria, and
Hitler’s Germany rearming rather than using diplomacy to address the disparity between
its armaments and those of its neighbors marked the formal end of disarmament
diplomacy, the end of disarmament diplomacy as a tool that could prevent war or
maintain stability actually began right after the Washington Naval Conference in 1922.
In 1933 Japan further expanded its territorial conquests when the Kwantung army
moved into the Chinese province of Jehol, located adjacent to Manchuria, conquering it
and gaining control of all Chinese territory north of the Great Wall. An unsuccessful
attempt was also made in late 1932 by the Japanese navy to seize Shanghai. This effort
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failed due to stiff Chinese military resistance and Japan withdrew its forces from
Shanghai after international mediation. However, both the conquest of Jehol and the
assault on Shanghai were undertaken by Japan’s armed forces without authorization from
the Japanese government, which further eroded the Japanese civilian government’s
authority. By 1937 the Japanese government was completely dominated by Japan’s
military elites, and on 7 July 1937, Japan began a major offensive south of China’s Great
Wall, attacking Peking and the northern plains of China. This attack marked the
beginning of Japan’s broad war of conquest within China itself, a war backed by most
levels of Japanese society and one that did not end until Japan’s defeat by the combined
might of the Allied nations in 1945. 127 But it was the actions of the Kwantung army from
1931 onward within China that marked the beginning of the end of the treaty system
created by the Far Eastern Affairs Conference in 1922. From the Root Principles to the
Nine-Power Treaty the work of that conference ended with Japan’s territorial expansion
into Manchuria. By 1933, all the treaties created by both the Washington Naval
Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference had crumbled to the point that they
were no longer effective. The broad war begun by Japan in 1937 simply marked the
point when even the ideal of disarmament could no longer play a role in diplomatic
relations between the now feuding Great Powers. As a second world war began to take
shape from 1937 – 1941, the various powers of the world, strong and weak, were forced
to navigate a rapidly occurring cascade of diplomatic crises and gird themselves for a
seemingly inevitable conflict.
For the modern historian, looking back over the 1920s and 1930s, one key
question is what impact the work of the Washington Naval Conference and the Far
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Eastern Affairs Conference actually had on the course of events in the interwar years.
Unfortunately, this question defies any simple definitive judgment because the answer
depends on the perspective in which the diplomatic work of both conferences is
reviewed. Looking upon the events of the 1920s and 1930s solely from the perspective
of how they all led to or delayed the outbreak of the Second World War, the work of both
conferences seems a failure. From this perspective the treaties created at both
conferences were to ensure that the Great Powers remained stable and balanced, but by
1939 the balance of power between the Great Powers was hopelessly uneven and the
diplomatic situation badly destabilized, which in turn led to war. As both conferences
were ultimately called to prevent war and war still occurred, they both failed. This
viewpoint raises valid criticisms; while the treaties of the Washington Naval Conference
and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference covered specific agreements of conduct, the
underlying spirit behind them was to prevent war, in the end the system they created and
the later work they inspired did not prevent future wars. But viewing the work of these
conferences from solely that perspective is also inappropriate because it puts an unfair
burden upon the treaty systems created by both conferences. They had been created in
1922 to address a completely different diplomatic situation, and within that situation they
were a success.
The Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference were
called in 1922 in large part because there was a real fear of imminent war between the
United States and Japan and a real concern about the effect unlimited naval construction
would have upon global peace. The delegations meeting in Washington at both
conferences were not negotiating to prevent a possible war in fifteen years; they were
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negotiating to prevent a possible war in the immediate future. The Washington Naval
Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference picked up where the Versailles Treaty
ended; it was the first attempt by all the Great Powers still standing in 1922 to come
together collectively and establish peace through compromise. For almost a decade, the
work of both conferences proved successful; peace and stability were maintained. It was
not a tranquil peace; nationalist tensions marred future diplomatic relations between the
Great Powers, regional wars erupted, and despite these efforts and the work of the League
of Nations, many key issues of the era that would spark future conflicts were left
unresolved. The Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference
combined to attempt to establish a system that would allow for peace and stability, that
would allow nations to reduce their arms, that would create a chance for peace and
development in China and the Pacific. For a decade this system worked, not elegantly,
not perfectly, but functionally, and it did so because the nations that had created it stood
behind their work. The treaty systems created at both conferences only truly failed in the
1930s because the nations that had originally framed them abandoned them, either by
direct action or by neglect.
They did not abandon them overtly; the World Disarmament Conference of 1932
indicates that, but all the signatory Great Powers abandoned the Washington Naval
Conference and Far Eastern Affairs Conference treaty systems gradually through
inaction. Treaties, no matter how good the intent behind them, only have meaning if their
signatory nations abide by them and take action against those signatory nations that cease
to abide by their agreements. Japan in 1932 broke multiple treaties it had signed in 1922,
but beyond moral condemnation, nothing was done to chastise Japan for these actions.
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When diplomacy fails, it is because the threat of force behind it - moral force, economic
force, or military force - ceases to be a factor. When in 1932 the other Great Powers used
no force against Japan, this, in turn, encouraged other powers to act aggressively, further
undermining the spirit of disarmament and compromise. It encouraged nations to seize
and squeeze rather than negotiate and balance. It ushered in an era in which strength and
audacity mattered more than diplomacy and compromise; it ushered in a period of war
that the nations involved allowed to take place. The Washington Naval Conference and
the Far Eastern Affairs Conference succeeded in maintaining the peace and ensuring
stability, only until all the signatory powers that had created these treaty systems showed,
through action or inaction, that they no longer wanted the systems. At this point no treaty
system, no matter how skillfully written or carefully negotiated, can survive or have any
further meaningful impact.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has challenged, and hopefully displaced, the long standing historical
perception that the diplomacy of the interwar years failed utterly because it was
unsuccessful in addressing the political instability caused in the 1930s by increasing
Japanese militarism and the rise of Nazi Germany. As proof, this thesis has closely
examined two of the largest diplomatic efforts of the 1920s, the Washington Naval
Conference and Far Eastern Affairs Conference, and shown they were both highly
successful in defusing the tensions of the early 1920s, including those in the Far East, and
were vital in creating a decade of peace and international stability. 128 But by 1933 the
Five-Power Naval Accord and the Nine-Power Treaty were both no longer useful for
maintaining stability because the world for which they had originally been framed had
ceased to exist. Both treaty systems in 1922 had created an international system that, at
its core, strove to balance the Great Powers, limiting their naval strength to being
defensive in nature and removing causes for war in China. Both conferences in 1922
sought to provide stability and prevent aggressive war. For nearly a decade they were
successful in this objective, but by 1933 both treaty systems had unraveled completely.
There is no single event that triggered both treaty systems’ failure; instead, their failure
came about due to a slowly amassing aggregation of events that negated the assumptions
under which the treaty systems had been created. By 1933 the conflict and instability that
the Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference had avoided
for a decade became simply unavoidable; no treaty system could have contained the
increasing global instability that was roiling the international diplomacy of the 1930s.
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The diplomatic scene had drastically changed by 1933, but the change began in
earnest in 1926 with the signing of the Locarno Treaty, in which Germany and France
pledged to respect each others’ borders and Germany renounced all claims for territorial
adjustments to its western borders. Germany in the same year joined the League of
Nations. Both of these events, in combination, changed Germany’s international status;
now a “reformed” power Germany began to participate in the various attempts to create
new broader disarmament treaties in the late 1920s. Germany, when attending these
efforts, insisted that the full terms of the Versailles Treaty be honored, that equality in
land armaments be achieved between all the Versailles Treaty signatories, by either their
disarming or Germany being allowed to rearm. Although it officially abided by the terms
of the Versailles Treaty, Germany’s demand for armaments equality was unacceptable to
France. France in the late 1920s relied upon its arms superiority over Germany to offset
Germany’s superior economic strength and population base, creating an artificial equity
that French leaders saw as vital for France’s security.
This incompatibility in views on land disarmament, German equality versus
French security, was mirrored by incompatibility between British and American views on
the subject of cruiser limitations. This divisive spirit on issues of disarmament did not
create the impending drastic changes in the international situation alone, however, which
took a major catalyst of change in the shape of the massive economic contraction
beginning in 1929 and known today as the Great Depression. The Great Depression
forced every Great Power to deal with a rapid decline in economic productivity, and for
several of the Great Powers, this economic decline caused severe domestic political
instability. For one of the Great Powers, Japan, the Great Depression coupled with
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already existing domestic instability to create a political atmosphere in which part of
Japan’s armed forces, the Kwantung Army, undertook an independent campaign of
conquest within China and successfully conquered Manchuria. 129
This rogue military campaign by the Kwantung army resulted in more than a
sudden expansion of Japan’s colonial presence in China. By removing Manchuria from
Chinese administrative control, territory that was recognized by the other Great Powers
as Chinese, Japan undermined the system of balance created in 1922 by the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference. The Nine-Power Treaty and the Root Principles had called for the
Great Powers with interests in China to avoid seizing additional Chinese territory; the
signatories were only to maintain their existing holdings in China. Japan seizing
Manchuria clearly violated this principle; in addition, Japan undermined the American
diplomatic ideal of the Open Door for trade within China by closing Manchuria to foreign
commerce. The Nine-Power Treaty was further eroded by Japan’s successful campaign
of conquest in Jehol and its unsuccessful attempt to capture Shanghai. None of these
three colonial campaigns were authorized by the Japanese civilian government, but in the
end that made no difference. The Nine-Power Treaty by 1933 was no longer a treaty that
could govern the Great Powers’ relations with each other regarding China, and because of
this, China again became a possible touch-point for conflict. Japan’s campaigns in
China, and other aggressive campaigns by Italy in the 1930s, also marked the end of the
ideal of disarmament. 130
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The work of the Washington Naval Conference depended on the work of the Far
Eastern Affairs Conference; disarmament as a diplomatic ideal only worked in an
environment in which the disarming powers felt relatively safe from aggression in their
respective spheres of influence. As Japan undertook its campaigns of conquest in China,
even if reluctant on a governmental level to do so, the other powers faced the real
prospect of a war in China due to increasing Japanese militarism. The failure of the
World Disarmament Conference in 1932 to create any disarmament treaties was due in
part to Japanese militarism but also to Germany’s demands for equity in arms with all the
other Great Powers. This forced France to refuse to consider disarming due to the risk
posed to its security by a Germany militarily equal to it, a concern that only grew more
pronounced when Germany withdrew from the World Disarmament Conference in 1933
with Adolph Hitler’s rise to power. The World Disarmament Conference failed to
regulate land armaments because of these tensions. It also failed to achieve any
extension of the system of naval limitations created at the Washington Naval Conference
due to two growing naval rivalries, one between Great Britain and the United States on
the issue of cruisers, and another between Italy and France on the issue of Mediterranean
naval parity. 131
The failure of the World Disarmament Conference in 1933 was only the
beginning of a period when Great Power relationships degraded and an increasing
number of powers chose to increase their spheres of influence through aggression rather
than diplomacy. This degradation of Great Power diplomacy reflected a growing
imbalance in strength between the Great Powers that began in the mid-1920s and lasted
until the mid-1930s, the point at which all the Great Powers began programs of rapid
131
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armament increases. From the mid-1920s through the Great Depression, the United
States, Great Britain, and France each chose not to expand their navy’s capital ships up to
the limits allowed under the Five Power Naval Accord. Instead, each of these three Great
Powers had only removed older capital ships and allowed their overall fleet strength to
decline. In contrast, Japan and Italy from the mid-1920s onwards had both expanded
their navies beyond limits allowed to them in the Five Power Naval Accord. Because of
these respective policies, the Great Powers were no longer truly balancing each other in
naval strength by the mid-1930s, a situation that encouraged the aggressive actions of
Japan and Italy because for any other Great Power to wage war against these two powers
effectively it would have to raise considerable air, land, and naval strength. Furthermore,
this imbalance of power further weakened the treaty systems established in 1922 by both
the Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference. Both treaty
systems were based upon mutual respect between the signatory Great Powers, respect
based upon an equality of strength between them. Once this equity was undermined,
aggression by stronger powers became more feasible, and it was this possibility of
aggression being used successfully that really sparked the final collapse of international
diplomacy that culminated in the outbreak of World War II.
The events of the mid to late 1930s leading to war are well documented. The
broad 1937 Japanese offensive into China mentioned in Chapter Four is widely
recognized as the beginning campaign of World War II, but other events from 1936
onwards marked the march towards global war. Germany, after resigning from the
World Disarmament Conference, announced its intention to rearm to parity with the other
Great Powers and renounced the constraints of the Versailles Treaty. In practice,
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Germany expanded its military capacity beyond that of any other Great Powers in the late
1930s. The litany of territory Germany gained through intrigue and threat of war
documents the collapse of an independent central Europe. Germany gaining the
Rhineland, Austria, and then Czechoslovakia only added to its economic and military
strength. The actual outbreak of European war in 1939 over Germany’s actions in Poland
marked the point at which other Great Powers ceased to accept Germany’s growing
domination of Europe. Italy’s conquests in the 1930s of Ethiopia and Albania marked its
growing expansionism, while Japan’s war in China combined with Germany’s gains to
engulf most of the globe in warfare. It was not until 1945 that the imbalance of military
power between the Great Powers that began in the mid-1920s was finally resolved with
the subjugation of each of the original aggressive powers. 132
From the perspective of preventing conflict, the Washington Naval Conference
and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference could be considered failures due to the outbreak
of the war that began in 1937 and embroiled the globe by 1939. However, by that
standard, every major diplomatic creation and effort of the inter-war years must be seen
as a failure, from the Versailles Treaty of 1919 to the League of Nations to the Locarno
Treaty to even the Munich Pact of 1938, but this is a flawed perspective from which to
judge these two conferences. The Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern
Affairs Conference had both created treaty systems that their creators had hoped would
prevent war and create stability, but not for all future time. Both treaty systems created at
these two conferences were designed to provide practical and workable solutions to
issues that threatened to provoke war and create Great Power instability in 1922. Just one
decade later the world had drastically changed, and efforts to modify the solutions created
132
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by these two conferences could not help but fail. By 1932, the Great Powers’ differences
could no longer be resolved by diplomatic measures like disarmament or mutual
negotiation. The balance between the Great Powers by 1932 would have to be forged
anew through conflict, the differences in strength and position settled by violence. The
Washington Naval Conference and the Far Eastern Affairs Conference had both
originally created a system of diplomatic balance and stability; they had worked in
combination to contain Great Power conflicts for a decade. Both conferences should be
seen as diplomatic successes, they did not fail but the world around them changed so
drastically as to make them irrelevant.
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